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EUROPE: NEITHER PLAN COLOMBIA, NOR PEACE PROCESS -- 
FROM GOOD INTENTIONS TO HIGH FRUSTRATIONS
  
 
   
 
 
Europe and Colombia 
 
  
Introduction 
 
In the eve of the presidential elections of May 26, 2002, only months after the end of the 
negotiations between the Colombian government and the guerrillas, the massacre of more 
than a hundred civilians (most of them children) in Bojayá, department of Chocó, 
dramatized the contradictory opinions of different actors regarding the nature of the 
Colombian conflict. While the United States considers the guerrillas as “terrorists”, the 
European Union has resisted labeling them as such in expectation of a renewed cease fire 
and subsequent negotiations.  The Spanish presidency of the EU sided with the 
Colombian government considering these activities as “terrorism”. This episode  marked 
the end of one cycle of the European involvement in Colombia and the beginning of a 
new one, full of enigmas, limitations, frustrations and still considerable hope.           
 
  Since mid 2000, with the public announcement of the reshaped original Plan 
Colombia, the European attitude toward its involvement in attempting to solve the crisis 
of endemic violence has oscillated from alarm to hope, and finally to frustration. A sense 
of powerlessness, mixed with realism and internal contradictions between member states 
and institutions of the European Union (EU), has dominated the overall scene. In the 
early stages, Europeans remained cautious of the U.S.-inspired Plan Colombia, badly 
promoted as a credible Colombian project. “A virtual contribution” to what appeared to 
                                                 
 Monograph originally presented at the conference on “Colombia’s Ambiguous War in Global and 
Regional Context: Insurgency, Transnational Crime, and Terror,” organized by the U.S. Army War College 
and the North-South Center from March 24-26, 2002, in Miami. This document updates and summarizes a 
previous paper presented at the conference on “Implementing Plan Colombia: Strategic and Operational 
Dimensions for the U.S. Military,” also organized by the U.S. Army War College and the North-South 
Center, January 31 – February 2, 2001, Miami, Florida. My gratitude is extended to Ambler H. Moss, 
Director of the North- South Center, and to Max Manwaring, of the U.S. Army War College, for their 
support in designing the scope of this research, and to Aimee Kanner for editing the text. The updated 
paper also served as a base for discussion in the conference on “Existe una política de la Unión Europea 
para Colombia?”, organized by the Institut d’Hautes Etudes de l’Amerique Latine of the University of Paris 
(Sorbonne) on March 19-20, 2002, and as a background document for a report drafted in a workshop 
organized by the Fundación Ideas para la Paz in Cartagena de Indias, April 25-26, 2002, thanks to the 
invitation of Pilar Gaitán and Fernando Cepeda. 
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be “a virtual Peace Process”
1 –in the off-the-record words of European Union 
Commission staff--, accurately described, in essence, the European attitude.
2 “Good 
intentions” became the label attributed to the European involvement in Colombia, 
illustrating not only its willingness but also its limitations. “Don’t look a gift horse in the 
mouth,” seemed to be the Colombian attitude in view of the pledged yet ambiguous 
European contribution. High expectations were detectable in public declarations 
considering the significant diplomatic capital invested. 
3 
 
At the same time, a clear message was sent that Europe wanted to distance itself 
as much as possible from the Plan Colombia, understood as a project centered around 
counter-insurgency and security issues. After a brief period of uncertainty and the 
successful and hopeful attempts to revive the Peace Process, the European diplomacy 
seemed to have its role strengthened from a rank of mere observer to a status of 
participant in brokering the Peace Process, which was on the verge of collapse in early 
January 2002. The renewal of the process was then credited to the role of the 
international community, with heavy European involvement. However, apprehension, 
pessimism, and a certain degree of realism finally set in the minds of European leaders in 
view of the decision by President Andrés Pastrana of Colombia to terminate the peace 
process on February 20, 2002. Considering the continuation of the violent activities 
perpetrated by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), culminating 
with the kidnapping of Eduardo Gechem Turbay, a prominent Colombian senator, 
Pastrana ordered the Colombian troops to enter the territory previously awarded as 
sanctuary.
4  
 
Meanwhile, under the new Bush administration, U.S. opinion had already shifted 
toward a more hard line attitude, as former Clinton administration officials reflected in 
                                                 
1 For a complete up to date analysis of the evolution of the conflict and a documented registry of proposals 
and different ideas, consult the website of the Fundación Ideas para la Paz: http://www.ideaspaz.org/ 
   
2 Numerous officers of the governments of France, Germany, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom, and several members of the staff of the European Commission and Parliament have contributed 
with commentaries and documents. All of them elected to remain anonymous and should not be held 
accountable for the content or tone of my commentaries, which are of my exclusive responsibility. 
3 The content of this presentation is reflected in the following articles: “European Union perceptions of 
Plan Colombia: A Virtual Contribution to a Virtual War and Peace Plan?” U.S. Army War College/North-
South Center, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 2001; “Europa y el Plan Colombia: el doble discurso de la UE,” 
Política Exterior (Madrid), Vol. XV, septiembre-octubre 2001, Num. 83, pp. 31-42; “La asistencia europea 
a Colombia: ¿una contribución virtual a un plan virtual de paz? Colombia Internacional (Universidad de 
Los Andes), 2001.  
4 For samples of the impact of this dramatic event on the future of international cooperation, as reflected in 
the Colombian press, see: El Tiempo,  “Se rompió el proceso de paz con las Farc,” 20 febrero 2002; El 
Espectador,  “CE estudia cooperación con Colombia tras ruptura  proceso paz”, 22 febrero 2002; Marta 
Rojas, “En marcha ‘Operación Tanathos’”, El Espectador, 21 febrero 2002; El Espectador, “Unión Europea 
‘justifica’ y respeta la decisión de Pastrana,” 21 febrero 2002; El Espectador, “¿Es posible revivir el 
proceso?”, 21 febrero 2002; El Espectador, “Los países amigos, en vigilia”, 21 febrero 2002; El Tiempo, 
“Se rompió el proceso de paz con las Farc; el ejército entra al Caguán después de la medianoche”, 20 
febrero 2002; Víctor Manuel Vargas, “Europeos  creen  que  tarde o temprano  habrá  que  construir una 
salida política al conflicto”, El Tiempo, 22 de febrero 2002. 
  4   
timely columns.
5 Editorials endorsed President Bush’s attempts to make U.S. support 
more effective.
6 These published opinions confirm that many U.S. elite had significantly 
shifted toward the idea of more active participation in the Colombian conflict, sidelining 
the peace negotiations as an apparent result of the attacks of September 11. “Terrorism” 
was the code word widely used, replacing “counter-insurgency strategy” and “curtailing 
narco-trafficking” which was the original framework sold to Congress to justify the need 
for Plan Colombia. The Colombian government began to lobby energetically for the use 
of U.S. counter-drug trafficking resources in the anti-insurgency activities, equating the 
fight against the FARC to the military offensive against Al Qaeda.
7 In public statements, 
the White House limited its position to the parameters outlined by Congress in the fight 
against drugs.
8    
 
Mexican and U.S. media dedicated special attention to the sudden shift with 
apprehension and anticipation of more dramatic news to come.
9 The lively Hispanic op-
ed columnists from Miami expressed caution but at the same time endorsed the 
Colombian government.
10 In Europe, Spanish commentaries captured the nature of the 
event.
11 The British media took due notice, setting the tone for the rest of European 
                                                 
5 Peter Romero, “Save Colombia,” The Washington Post, February 20, 2002, A15. 
 
6 The Miami Herald, “Colombia Strikes Back Attacking Terrorist  Rebels”, February 22, 2002; The 
Washington Post, “Help for Colombia,” February 24, 2002, B06. 
7 AFP, “Ofensiva de las FARC se acerca a Bogotá”, Diario las Américas, 28 febrero 2002. 
8 EFE, “Bush le dice ‘no’ a Pastrana,” El Nuevo Herald, 28 febrero 2002, 1A. 
9 Wilson, Scott, “Colombian Army Ordered Into Haven As Rebel Talks End”, The Washington Post, 21 
febrero 2002; Wilson, Scott, “Colombia Seeks More U.S. Aid for a Broader War”, The Washington Post, 
February 24, 2002; Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, “Ruptura  en Colombia”, Reforma, 22 febrero 2002; Juan María 
Alponte, “Colombia: ruptura definitiva ¿o qué?”, El Universal, 22 febrero 2002; Frances Robles, 
“Colombia invades to take back rebel zone”, The Miami Herald,  February 22, 2002; El Nuevo Herald, 
“Fin al proceso de paz”, 21 febrero 2002.; Gonzalo Guillén, “Guerra frontal a las FARC”, El Nuevo 
Herald, 22  febrero 2002; The Miami Herald, “Colombia Strikes Back Attacking Terrorist  Rebels”, 
February 22, 2002; Diario Las Américas,“FARC exige canjear rebeldes presos por Ingrid Betancourt”, 26 
febrero 2002; El Nuevo Herald, “En Primer Plano”, 25 de Febrero 2002; EFE, “Cuestionan la presencia de 
soldados de EU en la antigua zona de despeje”, El Nuevo Herald, 25 febrero, 2002; Frances Robles, 
“Colombian rebels waiting for army”, The Miami Herald, February 26, 2002; Anabelle De Gale, “En 
Primer Plano”, El Nuevo Herald , 25 febrero 2002; AFP, “La guerra es total entre FARC y paramilitares”, 
El Nuevo Herald, 26 febrero 2002; Fabiola Santiago, “Abducted Colombian candidate is an unusual 
politician”, The Miami Herald, February 26, 2002; Gonzalo Gullén, “Las FARC golpean con secuestro de 
candidata”, El Nuevo Herald, 25 febrero 2002; El Nuevo Herald, “Las FARC  contaminan  un acueducto”, 
25 febrero 2002. 
10 Guillermo I. Martínez, “Hay que ayudar a Colombia,” Diario Las Américas, 28 febrero 2002; Max J. 
Castro, “Go into Colombia fully aware”, The Miami Herald, February 26, 2002; Daniel Morcate, “La 
guerra de todos,” El Nuevo Herald, 28 febrero 2002, 12A. 
11 Francisco Santos, “Más de lo mismo”, El País, 22 febrero 2002; El País, “La hora de la guerra”, 22 
febrero 2002; El País, “El proceso de paz en Colombia queda en el aire tras el secuestro de un senador”, 21 
febrero 2002; Pilar Lozano, “Pastrana iza la bandera colombiana en el terreno recuperado a la guerrilla”, El 
País, 24 febrero 2002: 
http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20020224&xref=20020224elpepiint_3; Pilar Lozano, 
“Indignación por las víctimas de los bombardeos del Ejército”, El País, 24 febrero 2002: 
http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?xref=20020224elpepiint_4&type=Tes&anchor; 
Pilar Lozano, “El Ejército de Colombia reconquista la base de las FARC en la zona neutral”, El País, 23 
febrero 2002: http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?xref=20020223elpepiint_2&anchor=elpepiin 
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opinion.
12 European leaders expressed understanding and support for President Pastrana’s 
decision. The EU presidency issued the following declaration, setting the tone for future 
actions, while expressing its general attitude toward the crisis:  
 
 The European Union fully understands and respects the decision which the President of 
Colombia felt obliged to take on 20 February 2002, putting an end to the Process, which 
began in 1998, of dialogue, negotiation and the signing of agreements with the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC-EP) and to the Disengagement Zone. 
President Andrés Pastrana has, throughout those years, displayed an untiring determination to 
achieve peace in Colombia, which, unfortunately, cannot be said of the FARC-EP. 
 The European Union utterly condemns the latest attack against the civilian population 
attributed to the FARC-EP. The gravity of the aircraft hijacking and the kidnapping of several 
of its passengers demonstrates that the FARC-EP pay no heed to the repeated calls from the 
whole of Colombian society and the international community to ease the conflict. 
 The European Union deeply regrets the fact that, since the signing on 20 January 2002 of the 
Consensus Schedule Agreement for the future Peace Process with the Colombian 
Government, the FARC-EP have demonstrated their lack of willingness to make serious 
progress in the Process, by failing to honor the undertakings signed with the Government. The 
FARC-EP's grave provocations have led to the breakdown of a negotiating process on which 
the Colombian people had based their hopes for peace. The European Union profoundly 
deplores these provocations, which come on top of the violence which the paramilitaries 
continue to perpetrate. 
 The European Union has reiterated several times its rejection and condemnation of the 
practice of kidnapping, extortion and other crimes committed by armed groups in Colombia. 
In the present grave circumstances, the EU renews its urgent appeal for respect for 
International Humanitarian Law and the protection of the civilian population, and it reserves 
the right to change its policy towards the armed groups. 
 At this difficult time, the European Union wishes to express its support for and solidarity with 
the Colombian people as a whole, and with President Pastrana and his Government. The 
Union hopes that Colombian democracy, on the basis of a strict observance of the Rule of 
Law and full respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, can completely fulfill the 
aspirations for peace and prosperity of all the Colombian people. 
 The EU once again assures the Colombian people of its support for any initiative to establish 
a genuine dialogue with a view to ending the conflict which is tearing Colombia apart.
13 
 
Reacting to the kidnapping of presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, the 
Spanish Presidency of the European Union issued a declaration condemning the action 
and demanding her release. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
12 Oxford Analytica Brief, “Colombia: Escalating Violence”, February 25, 2002: 
http://www.oxweb.com/search_results.asp?numberofresults=500&countries=Colombia; 
BBC News, “Outrage at Colombian kidnap”, February 26, 2002: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid_1841000/1841207.stm; Martin Hodgson, 
“Colombian army takes back rebel capital”, The Guardian, February 25, 2002: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/colombia/story/0,11502,656625,00.html; Martin Hodgson, “Colombia abandons 
peace effort”, The Christian Science Monitor, February 25, 2002:   
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0225/p06s01-woam.html; Belfast Telegraph-Financial Times,  “Politician 
seized in Colombia”, February 25, 2002: 
http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=020225005772&quer 
13 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the breakdown of the Peace Process in 
Colombia (Brussels, 22 February 2002). 
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 The Presidency of the European Union expresses its most energetic condemnation of the 
kidnapping of the candidate to the presidential election, Ingrid Betancourt, carried out on February 
23, by the FARC-EO, and it demands her immediate 
 release. 
 The Presidency of the EU wishes to transmit its solidarity to the family of Ms. Betancourt, as well 
as to the Government and the Colombian people. 
 The Presidency of the EU reiterates its full support for democracy in Colombia in facing terrorist 
acts that attempt to interfere with the development of the campaign for the upcoming legislative 
and presidential elections.
14 
 
 
The most important part of this trend-setting declaration was the labeling of these 
types of activities with the novel expression of “terrorist,” never used before by official 
European bodies when referring to the Colombian guerrillas. This was a drastic change of 
tone, detected by the Colombian authorities and international observers. Previously much 
softer expressions, such as “combatants,” were used by the international community to 
depict the behavior of this guerrilla organization. This declaration had a more complex 
profile. 
 
First, it was only exclusively issued by the Spanish presidency, in Spanish, with 
no text available in English or any other EU language, despite standing promises in the 
web page of the Spanish EU presidency. EU member state diplomats have noticed that 
the language used (most especially, the expression of “terrorists acts”) left the door open 
for multiple interpretations. The unavailability of an English text has added to the 
confusion and speculation.  
 
Second, European and Colombian interpretations range from the extreme thesis 
that the declaration was inspired by the Colombian government to the more mild picture 
of an attempt by the Spanish government to please both the Colombian and U.S. 
authorities, and at the same time lead the EU efforts to pressure the guerrillas. 
 
Third, the declaration (and its interpretations) would dramatically contrast with 
the decision of the EU on May 2, 2002, of not including the FARC and the ELN on the 
list of terrorists organizations, while the right wing paramilitary was posted on this 
roster.
15 As a result, the Colombian government, some of the leading presidential 
                                                 
14 This is an unofficial, literal translation done by the author.  Declaración de la Presidencia de la Unión 
Europea sobre el secuestro de la candidata presidencial en Colombia (Madrid, 25 de febrero de 2002). 
 http://www.ue2002.es/principal.asp?opcion=6&subopcion=1&idioma=espanol  
http://www.ue2002.es/principal.asp?idioma=ingles 
The complete, original text in Spanish (February 25, 2002) is as follows: 
 La Presidencia de la Unión Europea expresa su más enérgica condena del secuestro de la candidata a 
las elecciones presidenciales de Colombia, Ingrid Betancourt, realizado el 23 de febrero por las FARC-EO, 
y exige su inmediata liberación. 
La Presidencia de la Unión Europea desea trasladar su solidaridad a la familia de la Sra. Betancourt, 
así como al Gobierno y el pueblo colombianos. 
La Presidencia de la Unión Europea reitera su pleno apoyo a la democracia en Colombia frente a actos 
terroristas que pretenden interferir en el desarrollo de la campaña para las próximas elecciones legislativas 
y presidenciales. 
15“ Decision adopted by written procedure”, Council, May 2, 2002. For a complete documentation on the 
EU measures, see www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex 
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candidates (Alvaro Uribe and Noemí Sanín), and influential opinion columnists protested 
the decision and asked for help from the Spanish government. Other candidates (Garzón 
and the staff of kidnapped Betancourt) seemed to espouse hope that the decision would 
keep the door open for the FARC to negotiate. According to the Colombian press, this 
thesis was apparently the argument behind the European governments (allegedly led by 
Sweden and France) that opposed the official declaration of the FARC and the ELN as 
“terrorists” (as proposed by Spain and Belgium) because this would make it very difficult 
to pressure them for negotiations.
16 Following this logic, France has maintained an open 
door due to the fact that Ingrid Betancourt has dual citizenship. In the same line, Sweden 
would consider that labeling the FARC as terrorists diminishes the EU’s leverage. The 
Swedish government has categorically denied that it opposes the inclusion of the FARC 
in the list. On the contrary, it supports the measure.
17 The French Ambassador Daniel 
Parfait denied these alleged motivations and confirmed France’s endorsement of 
condemning all terrorist acts,
18 a statement passionately ratified by President Jacques 
Chirac during a press conference held at the II EU-Latin American Summit in Madrid on 
May 17. At the same Summit, President Pastrana obtained an unequivocal backing from 
Spain’s premier Aznar, who pledged to pressure his colleagues to include the FARC in 
the EU terrorist list.
19 European observers remind critics that not until the end of the truce 
did the Colombian government ever use the terrorist label.
20 This controversy also 
explains why the declaration of the Spanish presidency was not upgraded – it did not 
receive the necessary approval from the Council to become a full EU declaration with the 
potential of becoming a common position, or simply serving as the basis for the inclusion 
of the Colombian guerrillas on the terrorist list.  
 
However, as a result of the Boyajá massacre of May 2, 2002, the Colombian 
government and public opinion increased the pressure on EU representatives and 
Member States governments to include the FARC on a future list,
21 in the mist of 
                                                 
16 El Tiempo, “Pastrana sorprendido”, 3 mayo 2002; Pilar Lozano, “La sorpresa de la UE”, El País, 4 mayo 
2002; AFP, 3 mayo 2002; El Tiempo, “Colombia pedirá a la UE incluir a Farc en lista de grupos 
terroristas,” 3 mayo 2002; “Las críticas a Europa,” 2 mayo 2002; Víctor Manuel Vargas, “Diplomáticos 
europeos consideran ‘error’ lamentable no incluir a Farc en lista de terroristas,” El Tiempo, 4 mayo 2002; 
D’Artagnan, “Farc con visa,” El Tiempo, 4 mayo 2002; El Tiempo, “El despiste europeo,” 6 mayo 2002; 
EFE, “Presidencia española de UE apoya inclusion,” El Tiempo, 6 mayo 2002; Análisis Coyuntural, “la 
decision de la UE frente a las FARC y el ELN,” 3 mayo 2002.     
17 Explicit declaration by the Swedish ambassador in Bogotá, Olof Skoog, to the author on May 10, 2002. 
18 Explicit communication to the author.  
19 Cristina Sen, “Los Quince otorgan a Pastrana un balón de oxígeno,” La Vanguardia, 18 mayo 2002, 4; 
Bosco Esteruelas, “Aznar pide que la guerrilla colombiana figure entre los grupos terroristas de la UE,” El 
País, 17 mayo 2002, 2. 
20 Víctor Manuel Vargas, “Diplomáticos europeos”, El Tiempo, 4 mayo 2002. 
21EFE,  El Tiempo, “Presidencia española de la UE apoya inclusión,”  6 mayo 2002;  ANCOL, “Asegura 
Pastrana: Suecia se compromete a revisar exclusión,” 6 mayo 2002;  ANCOL, “Unión Europea evaluará 
petición,” 7 mayo 2002; ANCOL, “Lista de terroristas puede modificarse,” 7 mayo 2002.  APF, May 9, 
2002 “Solana qualifie les FARC de "groupe terroriste" à inclure dans la liste UE”.  
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tensions caused by corruption and calls for an increase of military resources,
22 while the 
Spanish presidency of the EU issued another declaration in which the following 
statements were inserted: 
 
The Spanish presidency of the EU expresses its most energetic 
condemnation against the new terrorist action taken by the FARC on 
May 2… The EU has reiterated it firm condemnation of the violation of 
human rights and international humanitarian law perpetrated by armed 
groups in the course recent years in Colombia…. The EU has identified 
among its priorities the fight against terrorism and the need to prosecute 
criminal and terrorist activities that are an attempt against the state of 
law and fundamental liberties… In this context, the EU has adopted 
specific restrictive measures directed against persons and entities, in 
order to fight terrorism. The elaboration of a list is among these 
measures, which implies a continued process to be revised periodically, 
resulting in the eventual inclusion of other persons and entities. 
Decisions in this regard are made by consensus, and they are solidary 
and confidential
23 
 
In the course of the II EU-Latin America-Caribbean Summit held in Madrid, 
President Pastrana received a successful backing from Spain’s premier Aznar with his 
promise to influence his colleagues for the inclusion of FARC in the terrorist list, while 
Sweden pledged not to oppose the measure.
24  However, in the aftermath of the election 
of Alvaro Uribe as President of Colombia on May 26, 2002, the ambivalence and 
contradictions of the different EU actors in labeling the FARC became obvious, 
predicting a future flexibility, according to the long term objectives. While the European 
Parliament delegation visiting Colombia to witness the election branded the atmosphere 
                                                 
22 Afp, “EE.UU. suspende la ayuda a Colombia,” Diario las Américas, 10 mayo 2002; El Tiempo, Plata 
antidrogas fue desviada,” 10 mayo 2002;  El Tiempo, “Y qué dicen de la corrupción?” 10 mayo 2002; El 
Nuevo Herald, “Diez mil hombres más,” 10 mayo 2002. 
23 Declaración de la Presidencia sobre las ofensivas de las FARC (7 de mayo de 2002). The complete 
declaration in Spanish is as follows: 
 
La Presidencia de la Unión Europea expresa su más enérgica condena ante la nueva acción 
terrorista cometida por las FARC el pasado día 2 de mayo, que ha causado más de un centenar 
de muertos, otro tanto de heridos, casi ciento cuarenta desaparecidos y posiblemente cuatro mil 
desplazados. La Unión Europea traslada su más sincero pesar a los familiares de las víctimas, a la 
Nación y al Gobierno de Colombia. 
 
La Unión Europea ha venido acompañando activamente al Pueblo colombiano y al Gobierno del 
Presidente Pastrana en sus esfuerzos para mejorar la situación en el país. En sus comunicados, la 
Unión ha reiterado de forma constante su más firme condena a las violaciones de los derechos 
humanos y del derecho internacional humanitario que los grupos armados han perpetrado a lo 
largo de estos últimos años en Colombia. 
 
La Unión Europea ha fijado entre sus prioridades la lucha contra el terrorismo y la necesidad de 
perseguir las actividades criminales y terroristas que atentan contra el Estado de Derecho y las 
libertades fundamentales. En este contexto, la Unión Europea ha adoptado medidas específicas 
restrictivas, dirigidas contra determinadas personas y entidades, para luchar contra el terrorismo. 
La elaboración de una lista se encuentra entre estas medidas, lo que implica un continuo proceso 
que se revisa de forma periódica, y que podría originar, en su caso, la inclusión de otras personas 
y de otras entidades en dicha lista. Las decisiones al respecto se adoptan por consenso y son 
solidarias y confidenciales. 
24 La Vanguardia, “Los Quince otorgan a Pastrana un balón de oxígeno,”  18 mayo 2002; EFE, “Pastrana 
celebra que Suecia apoye incluir a las FARC en la lista terrorista,” Diario las Américas, 25 mayo 2002. 
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as presided by “violence, fear, intimidation and blackmail,” the culprits were considered 
as “insurgent movements”.
25 While Javier Solana, High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, expressed admiration for the democratic process, “in spite 
the campaign of threats, intimidations, and assassinations,”
26 and Josep Piqué, Foreign 
Affairs Minister of Spain, recognized the difficult conditions under “very serious 
violence threats,”
27 the Commission congratulated the new president for seeking dialogue 
with “armed groups.”
28 The “terrorist” label had disappeared from the declarations of the 
main protagonists of the EU implication, opening the door for a new setting for 
negotiations.     
 
In any event, while maintaining Europe’s pledge to help Colombia, the EU’s 
specific programs will have to be reevaluated in accordance with the new security 
situation. Europe’s contribution to a lasting peace in Colombia would have to continue 
from a distance. Before the elections of May 20, not only did Plan Colombia seem to be 
taking the road to an open confrontation, but the hopes associated with the Peace Process 
had vanished.  From good intentions, the European attitude changed to high frustration. 
In order to resume negotiations for a political settlement to this conflict, European 
involvement seems to be irreplaceable, and thus, a complete review of Europe’s 
perceptions and actions is in order.  
 
 
Rejecting Plan Colombia, Betting on the Peace Process 
 
In mid January 2002, a highly controversial agreement between the Colombian 
government and the FARC guerrillas over the extension of a sanctuary territory was on 
the verge of collapse. Under the threat of Colombian presidential ultimatums and the 
unpredictable guerrilla reaction, the unstable situation was in danger of degenerating into 
a full-scale war.
29 The direct potential result would be the invasion of the sanctuary 
awarded to the FARC. As the events of January 20 would confirm, there was an 
impending change in the policies and actions of the United States, widely discussed and 
lobbied for by various interests.
30  EU officials and numerous European diplomats
31 saw 
the end of their attempts to mediate a lasting peace, or at least, a partial truce in time and 
space. A statement on Colombia by the Spanish Presidency of the EU was categorical:  
                                                 
25 “Comunicado de prensa de la delegación de observadores del Parlamento Europeo,” Bogotá, 26 mayo 
2002. 
26 “Declaración de D. Javier Solana,” 27 mayo 2002. 
27 “Piqué felicita al ganador de las elecciones,” Madrid, May 27, 2002. 
28 Declaration, May 27 2002. 
29As a reflection of European perception: Juan Jesús Aznárez, “El Ejército colombiano se rearma para hacer 
frente a las guerrillas”, El País, 18 enero 2002:  
http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?xref=20020118elpepiint_6&anchor=elpepuint&type=Tes&d_date=2002
0118 
30 The Washington Post, editorial, January 14, 2002, p. A16; Karen DeYoung, “U.S. eyes shift in Colombia 
policy”, The Washington Post, January 15, 2002, p. A01. 
31 Mostly from the Group of Países Amigos (Spain, France, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Mexico, 
Cuba, Canada and Venezuela). 
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The Presidency of the European Union, deeply concerned about the 
current situation of the dialogue process with the FARC-EP, reiterates 
its support to the efforts of President Pastrana and the Colombian 
government to find a negotiated solution to the conflict. At the same 
time, it calls on the FARC-EP to confirm with facts their will for peace, 
and to find a way to keep alive the hopes placed in such a dialogue by 
the Colombian people and the International Community. Meanwhile, 
we support the decisions adopted by President Pastrana, as the 
legitimate representative of the democratic will of the Colombian 
people.
32 
 
 
  When the government and the guerrillas agreed to keep negotiating under extreme 
diplomatic pressure,
33 the EU confirmed its commitment to deliver assistance aid, 
including the funding of projects in the guerrilla-held sanctuary.
34 Brussels expressed its 
most positive statement to date on the process: 
  
 "The European Union expresses its satisfaction at the signing on 20 January 2002 of the 
Consensus Schedule Agreement for the future Peace Process between the Government of 
Colombia and the FARC-EP. This opens a new period and defines the priority issues necessary to 
take the Process through the implementation of concrete acts of peace, with specific and verifiable 
deadlines. 
 The European Union stresses the importance of the deadline agreed to on 7 April 2002 for a cease-
fire and an end to the hostilities. It considers of utmost priority the release of all hostages by the 
FARC-EP. The Union hopes that an immediate decrease in the intensity of the conflict and an end 
of human rights violations and of attacks against the civil population will create an atmosphere of 
trust to boost the negotiations and fulfill commitments already undertaken by the Government of 
Colombia and the FARC-EP. 
 The Union welcomes the contributions of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of 
the United Nations and of the Group of Facilitators in reaching the Consensus Schedule 
Agreement. The Union will continue to support the efforts of the international community in 
promoting peace in Colombia.
35 
 
  
The announcement
36 of a new schedule of talks leading to an April 7 hopeful 
cease-fire revealed the crucial role played by European representatives.
37 Although the 
                                                 
32Madrid, 10 January 2002. 
33 Fernando Cepeda, “Facilitación internacional”, El Tiempo, 15 enero 2002; “El papel de la comunidad 
internacional”, Editorial,  El Tiempo, 21 enero 2002: http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/21-01-
2002/prip160013.html. ABC: http://www.abc.es/especiales/index.asp?tid=4&hid=2064&cid=2064 
34 AFP, “La UE no excluye financiar proyectos en zona de las FARC”, Diario las Américas, 16 enero 2002, 
p A.; AFP,  “Unión Europea y España apoyan”,  Diario las Américas, 13 enero 2002, p. 3A. 
35 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Schedule Agreement between the 
Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP (Brussels, 24 January 2002).
 
36 For a complete text of the agreement: http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/21-01-2002/prip159999.html; From 
the Colombian government:  http://www.presidencia.gov.co/webpresi/noticias/2002/enero/infenot.htm 
37El Tiempo, 21 enero 2002: http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/21-01-2002/prip159998.html 
Gonzalo Guillén, “Firmarán la tregua en abril”, El Nuevo Herald, 21 enero 2002, p, 1A; Nancy San Martín, 
“Colombia peace process revived”, The Miami Herald, January 21, 2002, 3A; Le Monde, 
http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3222--258520-,00.html 
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armistice was no longer anticipated, the EU and European governments had invested 
considerable amount of diplomatic energy, political support and continuous funding of 
regional and bilateral projects to the Peace Process (so called in European circles, 
rejecting the spirit and the letter of the original U.S.-led Plan Colombia).
38 Consequently, 
the eventual total collapse of the tenuous negotiating lines represented a major setback 
not only for the staff of the European Union, but also for the political reputation of 
numerous European heads of government and state. Established on March 9, 2001, in Los 
Pozos (Caquetá), the Dialogue Table (Mesa de Diálogos) of 26 Países Amigos (to meet 
every six months), created a Comisión Facilitadora (to meet bimonthly, and later more 
often), composed of ten countries (Canada, Cuba, Spain, France, Italy, Mexico, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland and Venezuela). An open confrontation between the FARC and the 
Colombian Army would also have endangered the systematic diplomatic role of 
European governments in the negotiations with the other Colombian guerrilla 
organization, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). This danger has been magnified 
since the February 20 breakdown.      
 
The Colombian government saw a sign of relief  in the fact that economic and 
social assistance has been expected to come mostly from Europe. The satisfaction in 
Europe and Colombia was visible when late Sunday, January 20
th, hours before the 
deadline, the Colombian government and the FARC confirmed (as advanced by the 
media
39) a new agreement to rejoin the peace negotiations.
40 In spite of the fragility of the 
agreements, the role of the international community and most especially the efforts of 
European diplomats, was generously credited as irreplaceable.
41 A declaration from 
Brussels came in an unequivocal manner: 
 
 "The European Union acknowledges the efforts carried out by President Pastrana of Colombia to 
re-launch the process of dialogue founded on the San Francisco de la Sombra Agreement, which 
established the need of a cease-fire and the interruption of hostilities. Likewise, the European 
Union condemns the kidnappings, the attacks against the civil population, the extortions and the 
destruction of national infrastructures. 
 The European Union also embraces the work carried out by the United Nations and the Group of 
Facilitating Countries, particularly by the four members of the European Union, which has 
enabled the re-establishment of the trust needed to try to find a negotiated solution to this conflict. 
The International Community has carried out a very constructive and useful role throughout the 
negotiations, and the European Union shall support its presence in future negotiations. 
 The European Union hopes that the negotiations that are being carried out shall lead to specific 
facts, proving the will of the FARC-EP to sincerely advance in the procedure, complying with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
ABC http://www.abc.es/internacional/noticia.asp?id=73143&dia=Hoy 
38 For a complete chronology of this process: http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/21-01-2002/prip160010.html; 
ABC http://www.abc.es/especiales/index.asp?cid=2067&did=4941&tid=4&hid=2064 
39 Sol Gómez Giraldo and María Luisa Murillo, “Día de mucha expectativa”, El Tiempo, 20 enero 2002: 
http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/20-01-2002/prip159648.html 
40From the Madrid press: 
http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20020120&xref=20020121elpepuint_1&type=Tes&anchor=elp
epupor 
http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?d_date=20020121&xref=20020121elpepiint_2&type=Tes&anchor=elpe
piint 
41 AFP, “Comunidad internacional: papel clave en futuros diálogos”, Diario las Américas, 22 enero 2002, 
p.3A. 
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engagements signed with the Government. The European Union stressed its will to continue 
supporting democracy in Colombia and President Pastrana’s efforts to achieve peace as a State 
policy, in the frame of democratic institutions, the State of Law and the respect of human rights. 
 Finally, the European Union, once again, vigorously condemns the kidnappings, extortions and 
other crimes, which represent a flagrant violation of human rights and International Humanitarian 
Law. To this effect, it underlines that the FARC must take on a new stage, bearing in mind the will 
and firmness of the Colombian society and the International Community.
42 
 
 
                                                
The agreement, and the process that led to it, was not universally endorsed in 
Colombia, where a majority of the population and the leading candidates to succeed 
Pastrana have been critical of a policy they perceive to be awarding advantages to the 
FARC “with no practical return”.
43 In the Colombian media, the role of the international 
community was questioned regarding its limitations, contradictions and dependency on 
its national interests.
44 Domestic and international observers denounced the limitation of 
the pledge made by the FARC to discontinue collective kidnappings (labeled as 
“miraculous fishing”) but still authorize selective abductions in exchange for ransom.
45 
The political climate did not improve, kidnappings and assassinations continued, 
destruction of infrastructure became a daily routine, and threats of acute urban violence 
were translated into an ominous reality.
46 History seemed to repeat itself when President 
Pastrana cancelled his scheduled attendance at the World Economic Forum in New York 
City (as a gesture of solidarity by this organization following the September 11 attacks), 
as he did a year earlier when he returned to Colombia from Paris, skipping his trip to 
Davos, Switzerland, the regular site for this meeting.
47         
 
The highs and lows of European involvement are well-established. For most of 
2001, the overall agenda of the Peace Process/Plan Colombia was pending on the 
implementation of the latest EU official decisions. Coming off of a roller coaster that 
lasted more than a year, on April 30, 2001, European Commissioner for External 
Relations, Chris Patten, proudly announced in Brussels to an impressive gathering of 
international donors that the EU had confirmed a contribution of € 335 million (about  
$304 million) for the Colombian Peace Process,
48 a sum later elevated to about $366 
million.  
 
4216 January 2002. 
43Reflecting European opinion: 
Juan Jesús Aznárez, “'¡Ojalá Pastrana hubiera pedido ayuda militar a EE UU!'”, El País, 19 enero 2002: 
http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html?xref=20020119elpepiint_12&anchor=elpepuint&type=Tes&d_date=200
20119; 
 For a summary of Colombian opinions, see report by El Tiempo, 21 enero 2002: 
 http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/21-01-2002/prip159922.html 
44 El Tiempo, 8 febrero 2002: “Reflexiones en la encrucijada VI”, Editorial: “La otra pata de la mesa”. 
45 European sources have been very critical of this phenomenon perpetrated by both sides in the conflict. 
See Emilio Menéndez del Valle, “¿Adónde vas, Colombia?,” El País, agosto 2001. See also, the impressive 
report issued by Pax Christi, The kidnap industry in Colombia (2002). International efforts have reached 
the UN with a resolution approved by its Crime Prevention Comission for a proposal on Colombia (El 
Tiempo, “ONU: cerco mundial al secuestro,” 1 mayo 2002).     
46 Gerardo Reyes, “Inminente la guerra urbana en Bogotá,” El Nuevo Herald, 3 febrero 2002, p. 1A. 
47 EFE, “Pastrana cancela viaje por ataques,” Diario las Américas, 1 febrero 2002, p. 2A. 
48 “Colombia: an international commitment to peace”, Brussels, April 30, 2001; ANCOL, “Palabras del 
comisionado Chris Patten ante el Grupo de Apoyo,” 30 abril 2001. See also his article in Spanish entitled 
“Colombia: una contribución europea para la paz,” ABC, 1 mayo 2001. From Colombian sources:  
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Simultaneously, Colombian President Andrés Pastrana declared in Bogotá that the 
much heralded and controversial Plan Colombia was financially completed.
49 Added to a 
total of  $4 billion in Colombian funds, the European Union pledge completed the 
external funding of $3.5 billion. A grand total of $7.5 billion would power the scheme 
destined to transform Colombia from a disintegrating society dominated by guerrilla war 
and drug trafficking into a full fledged democracy with a prosperous economy. 
 
Ten months later, the overall panorama was full of enigmas and there were still 
dark clouds hovering overhead. The end of the process on February 20 was the final 
blow. The Colombian President is finishing his mandate. He has been receiving pressure 
from three fronts: the activity of the paramilitary forces, the ongoing terrorist and 
extortion policies executed by the guerrilla groups, and the suddenly-changed 
international strategy of the United States caused by the September 11 attacks.
50 
Meanwhile, very few concrete steps towards the implementation of the European 
assistance had actually taken place, due to the fact that security on the ground had not 
been conducive for the successful execution of the recovery and development programs. 
Nonetheless, while uncertainty mounted due to the new cycle of violence and controversy 
amid rumors of U.S. intervention and expanded assistance
51 in early February 2002, the 
European Commission announced in a supreme act of confidence and optimism the 
disbursement of the first installment for the specific projects in the Magdalena Medio 
region.
52     
 
  The diplomatic role of the international community, especially the European 
Union and its member states, has proven to be irreplaceable. This is still the case. EU 
leaders (such as Chris Patten
53 and Javier Solana,
54 and members of the European 
                                                                                                                                                 
ANCOL, “Discurso del alto comisionado ante comunidad internacional”, Bruselas, 30 abril 2001: 
http://www.presidencia.gov.co/webpresi/noticias/2001/abril/infenot.htm. 
EU website: 
“Multiannual Support Programme for Colombia”, Brussels, 28 October 2000: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/colombia/intro/ip_00_1184.htm 
49 ANCOL, “El Plan Colombia ya es una realidad: Pastrana”, 1 mayo 2001. For an update of the budget 
developed by the Colombian government:  
http://herramientasparalapaz.gov.co/index.asp?vinculos=1&noticiaID=243&programa=0 
50 Coincidentally, Secretary of State Colin Powell had a visit scheduled for Bogotá on September 11: 
“Powell aplazó visita”, Proceso de Paz en Colombia, Colombia, 12 septiembre 2001.   
http://www.procesodepaz.com/notas/Septiembre122001/B112N1.html 
51 AFP, “Protegerá EE.UU. la red petrolera en Colombia”, Diario las Américas, 8 febrero 2002, p. 1A; 
EFE, “Grossman: se puede usar ayuda de EEUU contra guerrilla,” Diario las Américas”, 7 febrero 2002, p. 
3-4; El Nuevo Herald, “Washington no cree en la voluntad de paz de las FARC”, 9 febrero 2002, p. 1A. 
52  “Peace process in Colombia: Commission launches 'Peace Laboratory in the Magdalena Medio'”, 
IP/02/213 Brussels, February 7, 2002.  
53 See news from EU sources:  
“Comisario de la UE visita Colombia”, Bogotá, 22 marzo 2001: 
 http://www.delcol.cec.eu.int/noticias.htm#patten1 
“Visit of Commissioner Chris Patten to Colombia”, Bogotá, 27 marzo 2001: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/colombia/visit/pc.htm 
54 See news from EU sources: 
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Parliament) visited Colombia in support of fact-finding missions. King Juan Carlos I 
extended protocol state visits to Bogotá dramatizing Spain’s support of the Colombian 
government and the peace process. The intervention of European diplomats in January 
2002 was highly instrumental in promoting the last minute attempt by the representative 
of the United Nations to stall what appeared to be the end of the truce between the 
Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas.
55  
 
The European diplomacy has maintained its leadership in the negotiations with 
the ELN. Inaugurating the Spanish presidency of the European Union, the Spanish 
government took the lead in the efforts to strengthen the feasibility of the negotiations 
with the FARC and the ELN. 
 
 
Europe’s Global Contribution: “Don’t Look a Gift Horse in the Mouth” 
 
Partly responding to public opinion pressure and as a follow-up to its preceding policies 
and programs, the European Commission led the efforts for international assistance to 
Colombia. On April 30, 2001, the impressive show of unity demonstrated by the 27 
countries and 10 international organizations convened by the IDB in the EU capital was a 
dream come true for world cooperation. In reality, however, only about $100 million 
were contributed by the EU institutional budget.  
 
But funding appeared to be coming from all corners in a sort of phone and 
television marathon competition. A year earlier, the United States promised $1.3 billion, 
$250 million of which were for social and institutional programs. Spain led Europe with a 
promise of $100 million. Japan committed $ 70 million for irrigation projects, the UN 
pledged $131 million for children programs, the IMF and the international banks 
provided almost $ 1 billion, and $ 300 million were earmarked for loans awarded by the 
World Bank, the IDB, and the Andean Community. The Swiss reserved $15 million and 
the Swedes confirmed previously pledged $20 million. The White House promised to 
convince Congress to dedicate millions to Andean projects. Even the Portuguese gave 
about $300,000.
56 The figures and scope of these contributions should not surprise 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.delcol.cec.eu.int/noticias.htm#solana; 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/colombia/visit/press12_03.htm, and selection of declarations:  
ANCOL, “Discurso del alto comisionado ante comunidad internacional”, Bogotá, 30 abril 2001: 
http://www.presidencia.gov.co/webpresi/noticias/2001/abril/infenot.htm 
55 For the new truce deadline: 
ANCOL, “Gobierno adopta plan estratégico contra terrorismo”, Bogotá, 31 enero 2002: 
http://www.presidencia.gov.co/webpresi/noticias/2002/enero/infenot.htm 
56 Juan Carlos Iragorri, “US$304 millones para Colombia,” El Tiempo, 1 mayo 2001; El Espectador, “Hoy 
se concreta apoyo europeo a la paz,” 1 mayo 2001; AFP, “Anuncia la UE $294 millones de ayuda a 
Colombia,” Diario las Américas, 1 mayo 2001; Alberto Sotillo, “La UE aporta 338 millones”, ABC, 1 
mayo 2001; Gabriela Cañas, “ La UE aportará 60.000 millones al proceso de paz colombiano,” El País, 1 
mayo 2001; Elisa Santafé, AFP, “Colombia completa fondos para la paz,” El Nuevo Herald, 1 mayo 2001.    
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unguarded observers, but should be placed in the wider context of the EU’s Andean 
program
57: 
 
 
Contribution of the European Union and European states 
 
Credit    Cooperation     Total 
  
Germany       18  million   18 
Austria         0.60    0.60 
Belgium       10.10      10.70 
Denmark        0.60       0.60 
Spain      76     24      100 
Finland         2.20                             2.20  
France         18    18 
Netherlands       7.20    7.20 
Ireland      0.90    0.90 
Italy        10     5        15 
Norway       20    20 
Portugal       0.25    0.25 
United  Kingdom      7.02    7.02 
Switzerland         8.5+12     20.50 
Sweden      4+16      20 
EU  COM       126    126 
 
Total:      86     280.37      366.97  
 
 
Although the figures may not look too impressive, they were of the utmost 
importance for Colombian officials, because the programs concentrate heavily on 
institutional and social strengthening, humanitarian aid and transparency. Priority zones 
                                                 
57 Comunidad Andina and European Union, “Reunión Ministerial entre la Comunidad Andina y la Unión 
Europea. Comunicado de Prensa Conjunto”, Santiago de Chile, 28 March 2001; 
http://www.delcol.cec.eu.int/noticias.htm#andina 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/andean/intro/index.htm; 
For a detailed multiyear plan of EU aid to Colombia: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/colombia/intro/sec_1647_en.htm; 
For a panorama of EU’s activities in Colombia; 
http://www.delcol.cec.eu.int/noticias.htm#ayuda;  
For an overview of EU’s relations with Colombia: 
 http://www.delcol.cec.eu.int/uecolombia.htm 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/colombia/intro/index.htm.  
For a list of itemized projects of the EU cooperation programs implemented by European NGOs in 
Colombia: 
http://www.delcol.cec.eu.int/proyecol.htm 
For an overall review of the EU’s activities in Colombia, see the newsletters Euronotas: 
http://www.delcol.cec.eu.int/euronotas/28.pdf, and especially the 2001 
http://www.delcol.cec.eu.int/euronotas/27.pdf 
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are the south of the Bolívar region, the southeast, Macizo and Magdalena Medio. A “Fast 
Track” process will be used to channel the funds.
58      
  
This atmosphere of optimism was at the same time tempered by ominous clouds 
on the horizon. Celebrating the May 1
st Labor Day, the FARC sent an internet message 
pledging “not a minute of silence, but a life-long of combat.”
59 They fulfilled this threat 
with a long year of violence culminating in the massacre of more than one hundred 
people in Bojayá, an area contested for control with the Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia (AUC).
60 Urban terrorism spilled over to the city of Cartagena de Indias, 
threatening its tourist industry, a survivor in the endemic deterioration of the Colombian 
economy.
61 The United States declined requests from pacifist organizations to delay 
delivering military aid.
62  Representatives of the European Parliament reaffirmed their 
view portraying the Plan Colombia as a war project and not as a peace program, with 
which the EU should not be involved.
63 The fine print of the official declarations and 
government statements also revealed the uncertainties and conditions under which 
international assistance to Colombia would have to be delivered. With the impact of the 
massacres inflicted by the right-wing paramilitary forces and the collapse of negotiations 
between the Colombian government and the ELN still fresh in their minds, the EU 
officers demanded a more rigorous policy from the Bogotá government and the need for 
heightened security for the personnel designated to direct and implement the different 
programs in the field. As in the past, the presidency of the EU issued warning 
declarations denouncing the uncertain climate.
64 Meanwhile, off-the record commentaries 
in Brussels reiterated that the figures of the announced contributions corresponded to old 
projects responding to the petitions of the Colombian government. This contradictory and 
ambivalent context has a tortuous and long history that can be traced back to the birth of 
Plan Colombia.                                             
 
With the deadline of January 31, 2001, Colombian President Pastrana agonized 
over the dilemma between negotiating with the FARC and unleashing the Army over the 
guerrilla-controlled DMZ territory after months of obtaining few concessions in return.
65 
Simultaneously, the Colombian government agreed to the details of another zone 
                                                 
58 Olga Isabel Echeverri, “Prioridades de inversión social”. El Plan Europeo, El Espectador, agosto 2001, p. 
8. 
59 FARC, “Saludo de las FARC-EP a los obreros y trabajadores en su día,” 1 mayo 2001.  
60 AFP, “60 muertos por una bomba,” El Nuevo Herald , 4 mayo 2002, 1A.  
61 Oscar Collazos, “Terrorismo en Cartagena,” El Tiempo, 25 abril 2002. 
62 Juan Carlos Iragorri, “US$304 millones para Colombia,” El Tiempo, 1 mayo 2001. 
63 Olga González, “Espero que haya ideas alternativas”, El Espectador, 1 mayo 2001. 
64 Declarations of the Belgium presidency (30 July 2001): 
http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.cfm?MAX=1&DOC=!!!&BID=73&DID=67597&GRP=3701&LANG
=1 
65 Among other commentaries and press reports, see: Miguel Angel Bastenier, “Ultimatum o rogativa,” El 
País, 2 febrero 2001; El Tiempo, “Tirofijo dijo sí,” 3 febrero 2001; Juan Forero, “Colombian offers to meet 
rebels and extend zone,” The New York Times, Febuary 1, 2001; Juan Forero, “Rebel to meet Colombian 
president, ”The New York Times,  February 3, 2001; Pilar Lozano, “El presidente Pastrana prorroga la 
zona desmilitarizada en Colombia”, El País, 1 febrero 2001; Pilar Lozano, “Marulanda, líder de las FARC, 
acepta verse ‘cara a cara’ con el presidente Pastrana”, 3 febrero 2001; Revista Cambio. “¿Quién para a los 
paras?”, 3 febrero 2001.    
  17   
awarded to the ELN under pressure from and with the mediation of the international 
community. At the same time, the European Parliament (under a Conservative-Christian 
Democratic majority
66) passed a Resolution opposing the Plan Colombia (with 474 votes 
in favor, only one against, and 33 abstentions), perceived in Europe as inspired by the 
United States with  “militaristic” and counter-insurgency purposes, with the potential of 
danger for spillover to other Andean neighbors.
67 In contrast, in order to demonstrate 
European support for the Colombian people, a European Commission-sponsored team of 
experts arrived in Bogotá to evaluate social and economic assistance projects to be 
funded by the EU and its member states. The ambassadors of the 15 member states 
accredited in Bogotá sent an energetic appeal to all parties in the Colombian crisis to 
resume the negotiations towards achieving a lasting peace.
68 
 
  This cloudy and contradictory scenario demonstrates that Europe’s involvement 
in resolving the endemic Colombian confrontation has been always very problematic. In 
spite of the heartening declarations issued by the EU and key state actors and the 
commitment offered to the Colombian government, the deterioration of the situation in 
2000 contributed to an increasingly pessimistic view. This negative assessment equally 
applied to the domestic evolution of the conflict and to the prospects of a European 
contribution to remedy the damage and to obtain a lasting peace, either via an adhesion to 
the Plan Colombia or as a separate aid package. European and U.S. perceptions of the 
Colombian problems and their causes have been too different. A give-and-take approach 
between Europe and the United States and mutual negotiation in identifying priorities is 
the key to a (still potential but difficult) trans-Atlantic cooperation.   
 
Although an early 2000 diagnosis might have been more optimistic, based on a 
good disposition of European actors to help Colombia, when the year came to an end the 
panorama had worsened. The long sought out European involvement in Colombia 
seemed to oscillate from two extremes. On one optimistic side, Europe was committed to 
supply the necessary political support for the task of bringing a lasting peace to Colombia 
by contributing around $1 billion in funds for social and economic programs. On the 
other, off-the-record voices warned that, unless the United States refurbished the most 
polemic parts of the plan, Europe would deliver “a virtual contribution to a virtual peace 
plan.”  
 
 
                                                 
66 Insiders of the EU Parliament pointed out that a notable number of the conservative members were 
absent, attending a gathering of the European Popular Party in Germany.     
67 AFP, “UE rechaza de plano la parte militar del Plan Colombia,” Diario las Américas, 2 febrero 2001; El 
Tiempo. Portafolio. “Eurodiputados piden a FARC descongelar el diálogo”, 2 febrero 2001; Bosco 
Esteruelas, “El Parlamento Europeo rechaza el Plan Colombia por ‘militarista’”, El País, 2 febrero 2001; 
European Parliament, “Resolution on Plan Colombia and the support to the Colombian peace process”, 
February 1, 2001; European Union. European Parliament. Nielsson, Poul, “Speaking points,” Committee of 
Development and Co-operation,” 31 January 2001; Joaquim Miranda, President. Commission on 
Development and Cooperation. “Intervention” European Parliament. Plenary session, January 31, 2001.  
68 Vicente Arcieri, “Empresarios, dispuestos a invertir en Colombia,” El Tiempo, 3 febrero 2001; El 
Espectador, “Apoyo internacional a negociaciones de paz”, 2 febrero 2001. 
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Plan Colombia in the European Perspective: Good Intentions 
 
The negative European perception became more explicit once certain details regarding a 
potential military involvement by the United States were announced and disseminated to 
the general public in August of 2000 during President Clinton’s unprecedented short visit 
to Cartagena de Indias. Consequently, an analysis of the anti-drug-trafficking efforts in 
the absence of sufficient attention given to social matters even further damaged the 
overall critical European evaluation of what, until that moment, was almost the exclusive 
domain of governments and specialists. 
 
Ironically, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy is the factor that 
very often provides cohesiveness to the Old World position. All it takes is for the United 
States to offer the Europeans an easy prompt, a project, an excuse. In this case, it was a 
plan. They will speedily trigger an impressive show of coherence to demonstrate a 
coordinated approach, independent from that of the United States. Three conditions are 
necessary to make this alliance possible.  
 
The first is that the policy that becomes the question of discord be affordable, 
with little cost to the European governments or organizations. The second is that the 
European resistance should be assisted by some sort of U.S. domestic opposition to the 
policy proposed or implemented by the U.S. government. The home front then becomes a 
European ally. The third condition is that the items on the agenda that are the subject of 
disagreement are not to be of a highly sensitive nature for any of the parties (U.S. or 
European) and of a global nature like the September 11 attacks. In other words, they may 
not constitute a serious threat to any of the new fundamental European security concerns 
(energy, migration, radical nationalism) or the special issues affecting any of the Member 
States. In this scenario, an ad hoc European opposition platform would fall apart at any 
given moment when the national interest of one of the European partners would seem to 
be at risk.  
 
Europeans also need to have allies in the U.S. home front, either in public 
opinion, partisan politics, think tanks, or the academic community.
69 Until September 11, 
Plan Colombia fit this bill perfectly. Regarding political and economic cost, it was 
affordable to contest it. It is regionally localized. It has been opposed already in important 
parts of the U.S. home front, especially by conservative columnists.
70 It helps if 
                                                 
69 For a comprehensive review, see the volume edited by the Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones 
Internacionales, El Plan Colombia y la internacionalización del conflicto, Bogotá: Planeta, 2001. 
70 For a selection of columns and press articles, see: Jane Bussey and Juan O. Tamayo, “Colombia drug aid 
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Robert E. White, “The Wrong War”, The Washington Post, September 12, 1999, B02; George F. Will, 
“Policy on Colombia is barren”, The Miami Herald, September 13, 2000, 7B; The New York Times, 
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Colombia’s Latin American neighbors are also in disagreement with the U.S. policy.
71 
This coherent scenario, however, suffered the impact of the September 11 events. It 
remains to be seen if European states will side with the United States in an expanded 
intervention in Colombia. 
 
It is also understandable that an issue as complex as the Colombian crisis is the 
subject of an internal debate among the leadership of the European Union institutions and 
the core of tactical disagreements between some Member States. The negative perception 
has never been monolithic. Some European sectors and governments are more prone to 
express unconditional support than others. Others are freer to vent their concern and 
irritation over some of the most polemic aspects of the Plan or its various interpretations. 
As a general rule, most of the Member States are very skeptical of a project that they 
perceive as U.S.-inspired. They also have difficulty understanding objectives of an 
operation that borders on injerencia in the internal affairs of another country. Although 
European officials are usually tame in their public declarations, they believe this conflict 
can only be resolved by Colombians. Government corruption, social injustice and the 
abandonment of state obligations are signaled as the causes of the crisis. However, at 
large, a general picture survives. Plan Colombia has been a candidate for a cohesive 
European response. On the one hand, the Europeans oppose the rationale of the military-
security strategy pursued by the United States. On the other, they struggle to design a 
joint policy. In sum, the major point of departure between the European and the U.S. 
point of view regarding terrorism is the attempt to equate the FARC with Al Qaeda. 
Europeans share with the U.S. and the Colombian governments the need to combine 
political, social and military analyses. The degree of each of these ingredients is what 
separates Europe from the U.S. views.            
 
Once the details of the U.S. backing were more explicitly known, the reaction in 
Europe could be described as a one-two movement of arms and hands; a sort of warm-up 
exercise. First the Europeans lifted their arms and placed their hands over their heads in 
disbelief and fear. Second, they positioned their hands in their pockets trying to secure 
their purses and wallets. After the first shock, European diplomats and government 
leaders were ready to check if their money was still in place. They felt that they were 
asked to pay for what could be described as big “incidentals”, becoming larger than the 
core projects. For example, in some construction projects the original budget balloons to 
stratospheric heights. European financial help would be needed once the military 
hardware and munitions were exhausted and the last drop of blood of the last Colombian 
man was wasted, as one Colombian scholar illustrated a few hours before President 
Clinton arrived in Cartagena de Indias.
72 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Containing Colombia’s Troubles”, editorial, January 15, 2001; The Washington Post, “The Colombia 
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71 Juan O. Tamayo, “Ecuador feels fallout from Colombia’s narcotics war”, The Miami Herald, November 
12, 2000, 1L; Stephen Buckley, “South America frets over Colombia, The Washington Post, August 31, 
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72 See articles by: Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, “Hasta el último gramo de cocaína y el último hombre 
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In sum, Europeans perceived that they were called upon to pay the expenses of a 
war that they did not perpetrate, did not expand, and did not make worse. For decades, 
U.S. involvement in some parts of the world, most especially some regions of Latin 
America, has been described as the movements of a well-intentioned elephant. The 
United States tries to have an impossible low profile, anchored to the terrain with slow, 
clumsy movements, prone to knock down the pole of the circus tent with tragic 
consequences. Plan Colombia fit this scenario. 
 
The global panorama contributing to this European perception has been 
complicated by the many successive versions and interpretations of the Plan Colombia 
officially announced by the Colombian government.
73 Apparently, not happy with the 
two complementary approaches developed by Bogotá and Washington to sell the same 
product to two different audiences (basically, the Colombian population and the U.S. 
Congress), Colombian authorities were eager to respond to the concerns of Europeans 
over the original plan and ideas by inviting Brussels to propose a “special plan for 
Colombia,” an invitation that the Europeans were ready to take. This was exactly what 
happened as early as May 19, 2000, when Colombian Foreign Minister Fernández de 
Soto met with EU Commissioner Chris Patten. He pointed out that the Commission’s 
concerns centered around the military component, the lack of involvement of the parties 
in dispute, not properly addressing the human rights issues, and the land reform and tax 
problems.
74 The avoidance of the label “Plan Colombia” became part of the European 
agenda and discourse. The use of expressions such as Peace Process became the rule.  
 
Having expressed these concerns, Patten took the lead in the pursuit of a solid 
European response to Colombian needs, expressing “disheartened”
75 sentiments and 
dismay (if not irritation) when some of the Member States dragged their feet in offering 
contributions and support. The External Affairs Commissioner was very blunt: “I am also 
concerned that some Member States want to disassociate European support from Plan 
Colombia. I fully understand, and even share to some extent, the criticisms of Plan 
Colombia. But it would send a worrisome political signal if we granted EU aid to projects 
which did not fit under the Plan.” Patten himself stated to Fernández de Soto that the 
Commission intended “to do everything in its power to continue the process” and 
proposed to the “member States that a European aid programme for Colombia be set up,” 
offering the services of the Commission to coordinate this joint effort.
76  The record 
shows that this task was accomplished.    
 
The European Union, the governments of the most influential members (by virtue 
of their historical linkages with Colombia, or because of the volume of their aid programs 
                                                                                                                                                 
túnel demasiado largo”, La Opinión, Los Angeles, 20 Oct 2000; Javier Valenzuela, “Estados Unidos teme 
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74Internal communications and interviews with EU staff. 
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76Internal communications. 
 
  21   
to Latin America, or both), and also the governments of other countries that are outside of 
the Union (Norway, Switzerland) have expressed an extreme degree of concern for the 
Colombian crisis. They also have pledged, in different terms and conditions,   
considerable resources. It seems that Colombia is a hot item. Not since Vietnam or the 
bloody clashes in Central America has Europe had a chance to become more involved in 
a conflict that erupted after the Cold War’s end. The urgency to act and cooperate in 
solving the pressing problems of Colombia has attracted the attention of all the influential 
European governments and organizations, with virtually no exception. Without a doubt, 
the narco-trafficking dimension has contributed greatly to this interest. Europe is 
suffering as much as the United States from the consequences of the trade and 
consumption of drugs.     
 
Two (different in nature) pivotal protagonists of European assistance are under 
scrutiny and pressure to be successful: Spain and the European Union institutions. Other 
governments (especially France and Germany) are caught between the need to speak up 
and pressure to cooperate in some way. Other states need to better express their positions. 
 
 
 
 
Major Actors and Secondary Partners 
 
 
The European Commission in the Driver’s Seat 
 
The Colombian scenario has been scrutinized by the EU Commission as one of the 
priorities in the region.
77 External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten has played a very 
difficult role in listening to the complaints of the critical member states (and the 
European Parliament)
78 over the Plan Colombia, welcoming the enthusiasm of others, 
especially the Spanish government, to offer cooperation, and at the same time not 
necessarily irritating the U.S. government. More explicitly than in other obscure and 
boring official documents, the view of the European Commission on Colombia and its 
justification for the need of European involvement were lucidly stated in a short piece 
published as a newspaper column by Patten.
79 In an exclusive interview given to 
Bogota’s El Espectador, he insisted on correcting the perception that the role of Brussels 
                                                 
77 For a comprehensive view of the Commission’s assessment of the Colombia crisis and the EU 
contribution, see Colombia. Country Strategy Paper 2001-2006 (2002). 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/colombia/csp/ 
In a candid language, Brussels outlines some fundamental problems: social inequality, injustice, corruption, 
impunity and poverty… [where] the cancer spread progressively and generalized to such point that the role 
of the State and its institutions has been dramatically reduced”.     
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September 12, 2000 (most especially an intervention of Colombian journalist Alfredo Molano Bravo), and  
the Resolution of the Parliament “Derechos humanos: violaciones de los derechos humanos en Colombia”: 
Alfredo Molano Bravo, “El Plan Colombia y el conflicto armado”, Revista Número, 12 septiembre  2000. 
79 Chris Patten, “Colombia: una cita por la paz,” El Mundo, Madrid, and El Espectador, Bogotá, 24 octubre 
2000.  
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was limited “to using its wallet”, conditioning aid to the respect for human rights. The 
EU Commission wanted to minimize the differences with the United States, but 
confirmed its participation in the Peace Process, not in what is officially known as Plan 
Colombia. European assistance will be concentrated on alternative rural development and 
institutional strengthening.
80       
 
In statements that need not be read with the typical disclaimer that his opinions do 
not reflect the view of the Commission (they do), Patten pledged maximum support for 
the main protagonists of the peace process: Colombia and the Andean states. The process 
needs a regional focus, to be originated in the region, in a balanced and integrated 
fashion, because the problems are larger and more complex than the domains limited by 
national borders. The main challenges are the violations of human rights, the lack of 
respect for the rule of law, and the deterioration of the role of the state caused by drug 
trafficking. Europe not only has an interest at stake, but also a responsibility. However, in 
spite of some signs of progress, the European commissioner for external affairs has a 
realistic view of the endemic conditions that need to be addressed with a deeper structural 
response. Violence is not only the cause of the problem, it is also the consequence of the 
prevalent situation in the country. That is why the EU Commission has to denounce the 
violations of human rights, whomever the perpetrators are, and demand their punishment.  
 
Trying to put his money where his mouth is, Patten pledged political support for 
the peace process with concrete financial backing in the amount of about €105 million, in 
addition to the standard humanitarian aid that was being provided. The overall 
contribution then amounts to about the US$300 million that were confirmed on April 30, 
2001. Confirming other declarations, three areas are the priority of the European Union’s 
attention: the promotion and defense of human rights, the reduction of the socioeconomic 
disparities, and institutional reinforcement.  
 
As in other EU declarations, the philosophical key for European involvement and 
modality is highlighted in Patten’s opinions. When observers of the new situation 
remember precedents of European involvement in Latin America with the corresponding 
disagreement with the United States, the clash over Plan Colombia brings back memories 
of the European opposition to how the United States dealt with problematic Cuba after 
the Cold War, especially regarding extraterritorial laws such as Helms-Burton.
81 
However, the European agenda in this case seems much better propelled by the perceived 
successful case of Europe’s participation in the negotiations to solve the Central 
American crises of the 1980s. The San José process and the conviction that the conflict 
was not caused by Soviet-Cuban involvement, but by social inequality, is the model that 
seems to be a candidate for application through a Plan Colombia II (the European 
view).
82  The explicit reference to the model of the Central American cooperation is 
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obvious in Patten’s column. As in that case, peace in Colombia is regarded as an 
enterprise calling for regional Latin American dimensions, in need of the contributions 
“by many people in many countries,” which former Costa Rican president Oscar Arias 
stated in his 1987 Nobel Peace Prize speech regarding his efforts to bring peace to 
Central America. In any event, the above considerations are reflected in the official 
declarations of the European Commission.
83 
 
In an effort to build a base for the identification of thematic sectors feasible as 
EU-sponsored projects, the Latin American Group of the REPER (permanent 
representatives of the Member States) agreed on a series of “principles”: 
 
 recognition of the Colombian civil society and local communities as fundamental actors,  
 the understanding that the Colombian government needs to contribute financially to the 
projects,  
 non-intervention of armed groups in the identified regions for EU activity, 
 neutrality and transparency in all EU-sponsored programs,  
 close relationship with national programs,  
 an expectation that the success of programs will not be possible without an impeccable 
respect for human rights and the modification of the redistribution system  of wealth and 
resources. 
 
Among some concrete measures and locations, the following are outlined: 
  
 EU activities should be inserted in a wider context of international assistance, most 
especially in the fight against drug production and trafficking. Massive utilization of 
fusarium axysporum should be banned.  
 The EU should use its diplomacy in the fight against chemical products used as a base for 
drug production, the intensification of inter-regional cooperation in drug-trafficking 
control, and in the fight against money-laundering activities.  
 Some specific regions are identified as a priority: the Choco, the Macizo colombiano, the 
South (Putumayo, Caquetá, Nariño), the Magdalena Medio (which became the star of EU 
efforts in subsequent months) and the Cartagena del Caira.
84   
 
However, observers could detect a double discourse between what Europe is 
asked to do and how Europe responds in public and off-the-record. European 
governmental analysis shows a worrisome, but understandable, double face. 
Governments maintaining a cordial relationship with the Colombian government are 
careful not to portray in public what in private and in confidential communications they 
consider an alarming picture. They describe the situation as endemic. They do not 
consider it simply as a conflict between government and guerrillas, sort of a cops and 
robbers pursuit in a tropical scenario, but of a society which is terminally fractured. This 
double discourse also applies to commentaries on an apparent agreement between the 
United States and Europe.  
 
                                                 
83 Communication from Mr. Patten and Mr. Nielson to the Commission, “Multiannual support programme 
for Colombia”, Bruxelles, 17 octobre 2000 
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/colombia/intro/sec_1647_3.htm 
84Group AMLAT, “Appui de l’Union Europeenne au Processus de Paix Colombien”, 7 September 2000. 
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When engaged in informal, off-the-record conversations, European officials tend 
to be forthcoming and clear. European governments and organizations are under the 
impression that they are called on to pay for a social and economic bill, while at the other 
side of the Atlantic the problem is reduced to a drug-trafficking and military problem. 
One graphic Spanish expression is characteristic of the reactions to the financial proposal. 
As a commentary on the section of Plan Colombia regarding the contribution of the 
international community,
85 one senior diplomat made this comparison to the role of the 
EU: “poner la pasta (shelling out the dough).”
86 In cruder terms, never detected in 
documents or veiled declarations, there is the prevailing European impression that the 
Colombians have been contributing the dead, the Americans supplying the military 
hardware and the Europeans giving the money to defray the cost of the social and 
environmental damage caused by the other two. This European assistance is perceived as 
a sort of remedy once the implementation of the U.S.-led military plan is terminated. This 
feeling is shared in corridors and after-hours meetings by many European diplomats in 
Madrid, Paris and Brussels and has permeated several reports and commentaries with an 
amazing cohesiveness. Expressions used by U.S. researchers match the picture given by 
European commentators. “With our economic cooperation they [Colombians] are going 
to clean up the dirty mess left by the Americans when they leave.” This harsh picture of 
the role to be played by European assistance
87  worsened after the breakdown of February 
20. 
 
In spite of all these difficulties, as a first concrete European Commission-
controlled and coordinated project, the EU executive signed on February 7, 2002, the 
Financing Agreement to implement the Magdalena Medio Peace Laboratory, for the 
amount of € 34.8 million. Commissioner Patten expressed the EU’s views with clarity: 
"The European Commission today takes a concrete step in support of a negotiated 
solution to the Colombian conflict by encouraging the active participation of civil society 
organizations in the pacification of the country. This program is a concrete expression of 
the EU's firm support for the peace process. We want to contribute to a wide national 
consensus in favor of peace. If this pilot program proves to be successful, we could 
establish a similar peace laboratory elsewhere in the country."  In an example of trust and 
cooperation, in agreement with national authorities, the Commission has delegated the 
implementation of the first phase to the Development and Peace Corporation of the 
Magdalena Medio (CDPMM), just awarded Colombia's National Peace Prize, with a long 
record of intervention in the Magdalena Medio, and high credibility among the 
Colombian population. This innovative project will encourage the broad participation of 
citizens in the search for peace. It will focus on “reinforcing local institutions, supporting 
civilian actors engaged in promoting peace and fostering economic and social 
development.”  It will have an impact on 13 town councils of the region, including the 
capital, Barrancabermeja. The "Peace Laboratory" concept builds on the participation of 
                                                 
85For a complete listing of the projects presented for international financing, see: 
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86Source: conference notes. See confirmation of this perception in Patten’s interview in El Espectador: 
Chris Patten, “Colombia: una cita por la paz.” El Mundo, and El Espectador, 24 octubre 2000.    
87 Expression quoted by James Petras, “El Plan Colombia y sus críticos”, El Mundo, 26 julio 2000. 
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citizens at the grassroots level, by exploring “ways to defuse the conflict and to bring 
about sustainable development.”
88  
 
 
 
The Controlling Role of the European Parliament 
 
With the end of January 2001 approaching, the deadline for the continuation of the DMZ 
given to the FARC as inducement for peace negotiations was looming over the minds of 
all protagonists. Dramatizing even further the seriousness of the moment, President 
Pastrana cut short his trip to Europe and returned to Bogotá under rumors of military 
pressure to intervene in the FARC-controlled area. At the same time, the Colombian 
government decided to give final approval to the details of another “despeje” zone for the 
benefit of the ELN. With the changing of the guard in Washington, speculation about a 
change of course towards Colombia abounded. Not by coincidence, the Committee of 
Development and Cooperation of the European Parliament took the lead and enacted a 
plenary session resolution of the European parliamentary body. The content of the 
declaration was read in different ways according to the inclinations of the Colombian 
actors and observers and it will be the subject of study in the future as a result of the 
course of events. 
 
  The Commission reaffirmed its position through an intervention by Commissioner 
Poul Nielson, a Danish Social-Democrat who holds the portfolio of cooperation. This is 
another slightly significant detail because first it shows that the interest of the EU is 
wider than the monopoly of one commissioner’s portfolio. Second, the approach taken by 
the international assistance portfolio since the latest expansion of the European Union 
reflects the impact of the Nordic countries views, equipped with a strict attitude toward 
accountability, efficacy, transparency and stress on human rights and democratization. 
Reminding the audience of the political and financial support for the Colombian peace 
initiative, Nielson again expressed the concern of the Commission for the “military 
component” of the Plan, confirmed the endorsement of the 1998 UN approach to the 
treatment of the drug problem, and pledged the support of the EU institution for positive 
measures in demand reduction and the strengthening of the rule of law. He committed € 
105 million for the period 2000-2006, with an additional 10 million in 2001, and 
announced the arrival of the EU experts to study projects in the Magdalena Medio region, 
earmarking another € 20 million.  He also confirmed the political support of the EU 
through the Group of Friends in securing the negotiations regarding the “despeje” zones 
and in the efforts to avoid the spillover of the conflict to other countries, advocating a 
regional approach.
89  
 
The Resolution of the Parliament was prompted by a harsh intervention of a 
United Left member of the parliamentary body from Portugal, Joaquim Miranda, as 
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president of its Cooperation and Development Committee. He first stressed that the EU 
cannot remain indifferent to the Colombian crisis or assume “ambiguous positions.” In 
his view, a crucial element of the present situation is the Plan Colombia, calling on the 
Commission and the Council to “distance” themselves from it, due to four main reasons: 
its “militaristic character,” its lack of “linkage process” in the Colombian society, its lack 
of recognition of the “paramilitary phenomenon,” and the fact that the Plan “endangers 
the negotiation process.” He recalled that the Council on September 9, 2000, called for a 
specific European plan, and he insisted on the need to differentiate it from the Plan 
Colombia, with a veiled criticism of the “only European government” [referring to Spain, 
as discussed above] publicly and financially committed to its support. He finally stressed 
the need for drastic social and economic reforms in Colombia to redress the historical 
causes of today’s problems.
90 
 
In this context, the plenary session of the European Parliament approved one of 
the strongest declarations ever made on the situation of a Latin American country. 
Besides insisting and elaborating on the above items and repeating portions of the 
declarations made by commissioners and parliamentarians (endemic crisis, violation of 
human rights, inadequacy of Plan Colombia, shared responsibility in combating drug 
trafficking) the text outlined a mandate for the EU to support a peace process with the 
objective of reinforcing the institutions, alternative development, and humanitarian and 
social aid. NGOs and civil society should be empowered for this task. Wealth 
redistribution is a must in a system where peasants do not own the land. In sum, the EU 
must implement its own “non-militaristic” strategy, with “neutrality and transparency,” 
and with the participation of civil society in the negotiation process. It urges the 
Commission to commit the necessary financial resources and receives with satisfaction 
the plan of the Council to evaluate the situation every six months. A regional approach 
and international cooperation to stop the trafficking of drug-producing substances and 
money laundering need to be part of the total package, calling on all armed to cooperate, 
and to the neighboring countries to contribute to a comprehensive solution. Most 
especially, the text expressed alarm by the fact that since the opening of the peace 
negotiations, acts of violence and terrorism (assassinations, kidnappings, massacres) have 
increased. Impunity has presided over the frustration and impotence of the population, 
while international observers (such as UN representative Mary Robinson) have certified 
the inadequacy of measures against the paramilitary groups, calling for an EU 
commitment to the protection and financing of human rights organizations.
91  
 
In recent months, the Parliament’s blame on violence has not been reserved for 
any one party, but evenly targeted on all factions. It has also come from different sides of 
the EP’s political spectrum, with the conservatives stressing the abuses committed by the 
guerrillas
92 and the socialist members (collectively or on an individual basis) pinpointing 
                                                 
90 Joaquim Miranda. President, Commission on Development and Cooperation. “Intervention”. European 
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91 European Parliament, “Resolution on Plan Colombia and the support to the Colombian peace process”, 
February 1, 2001. 
92 For a sample of a result of a fact-finding mission, see: Emilio Menéndez del Valle, “¿Adónde vas, 
Colombia?”  El País, agosto 2001. 
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the deep roots of the conflict in the social inequality and collapse of Colombia’s state 
system, by endorsing domestic analysis critical of the status quo.
93  With the precedent of 
a declaration of support for the peace process on October 4, 2001, the European 
Parliament approved a Resolution on March 16, 2002, summarizing its perception of the 
recent events around the end of the truce and the legislative elections. Among other 
items, the EP “condemned” the assassination of senator Martha Catalina Daniels, the 
kidnapping of five other senators and presidential candidate Betancourt since 2000, 
lamented the return of an open armed confrontation, and blamed the FARC for the 
renewed violence. While backing the decision of Pastrana and recognizing his efforts 
towards peace, the EP insisted that the Colombian president cannot “tolerate” the actions 
of the paramilitary. Finally, the EP, “in contrast with other views,” considered that the 
EU must continue supporting a negotiated and pacific settlement, including the necessary 
social reforms.
94  As a further sign of the EP Parliament concern for the Colombian crisis, 
a five-member delegation presided by Spain’s EP member José Ignacio Salafranca visited 
Colombia to witness the election of May 26, 2002, and offer a subsequent report and 
recommendations to the EU.         
 
 
Spain: A Special Relationship 
 
Spain’s perception of the Colombian crisis can be described as an apparent contrast 
between two attitudes. On the one hand, Plan Colombia generated a very critical reaction 
in the Spanish public opinion,
95 in the NGO network, and in the think-tank and academic 
community. If ideological lines were expected to appear in the analysis of conflict where 
Marxist-leaning guerrillas are involved, with the subsequent critical view of the Spanish 
conservative press, no such fracture has occurred in the case of Plan Colombia. On the 
other hand, observers may be puzzled by the publicly stated enthusiasm expressed by the 
Spanish government in participating with political support and funds in all avenues of the 
Plan. This apparent contradiction would make Spain the exception to the rule of the 
critical reception of Plan Colombia in Europe. However, this can be explained on two 
grounds. First, in the case of the Spanish government, the implementation of the double 
discourse was activated because it was convenient for the accomplishment of an effective 
public relations campaign vis-à-vis the Colombian and the U.S. governments 
simultaneously. However, while public declarations are respectful of the Colombian 
government and all sides in the conflict, in private the picture is as harsh as the one 
shown by the rest of the Europeans.     
                                                 
93 Pedro Santana Rodríguez, “Colombia: la crisis política”,  Leviatán, Madrid, otoño/invierno, 2001, pp. 65-
74. 
94 Resolution of the European Parliament, March 16, 2002. 
95 For a selection of the most critical early commentaries in the influential Spanish daily El País, see articles 
by: Miguel Angel Bastenier, “Ultimatum o rogativa,” El País, 2 febrero 2001; Eduardo Haro Tecglen, 
“Colombia”,  El País,  1 septiembre 2000; Herman Tertsch, “Mal plan el de Colombia,” El País, 18 
noviembre 2000; Javier Valenzuela,  “Estados Unidos teme verse envuelto en un largo conflicto en 
América Latina”,  El País, 27 agosto 2000. 
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The second justification for the apparent magnanimity and generosity of the 
Spanish pledge is grounded in two factors. The most convincing explanation for Spanish 
support continues to be the historical and cultural commitment of Spain towards the 
development and democratization of the Latin American continent after the Spanish 
transition was consolidated and became a point of reference. The governmental 
commitment is also explained by a less scientifically demonstrable factor known to witty 
observers as “the syndrome of signing up for everything” [apuntarse a todo] that still 
affects Spain after decades (if not centuries) of isolation. It works in a similar way to the 
European gut reaction to grab an issue to oppose the United States in order to counteract 
the overwhelming presence of the one and only superpower. In search of issues to 
demonstrate international protagonism, Spain is the opposite of an isolationist middle 
power. Colombia is an ideal issue. The novelty in the last part of the century is that Spain 
has returned to the Americas in a similar fashion as the one sported by the galleons in the 
times of Conquest. Spain has become the leader of European investment in Latin 
America. Although Spanish investment in Colombia is not as high as in Argentina or 
Chile, the spillover effect of the Colombian crisis has alarmed Spanish investors and 
consequently has propelled the Spanish government to act accordingly. Damaged by its 
political crisis, Colombia ranks as the second worst Latin American economy in a survey 
of Spanish firms, in terms of efficiency of public administration, economic and business 
prospects, enterprise business community efficiency and environment for business.
96    
 
It is a known fact that the diplomatic establishment of Spain has several 
ideological profiles. The conservative view that dominated the ranks of the Spanish 
foreign service in the 50s, 60s and 70s has been pushed aside by a more liberal and left-
leaning attitude towards the world’s problems as a better way to protect the national 
interests of Spain. In contrast with some European countries, a critical view of the U.S. 
foreign policy is not the monopoly of the Spanish left, but also a natural attitude of the 
right since the United States defeated Spain in the 1898 intervention in Cuba. When it 
comes to U.S. policy in Latin America and its link to the reactionary governments in the 
area, the Spanish diplomatic service is very critical at large. The Colombian crisis has 
served to consolidate both lines of thought. 
 
In general terms, the view of a notable number of Spanish diplomats, matching 
the perception of NGOs, academics and media, includes a picture of a fractured 
Colombian state, lacking legitimacy and territorial control, unrecognized by a society that 
demands justice. Among the urgent structural problems to be addressed are a culture of 
discrimination and social exclusion, a persistent armed conflict that equals a civil war, a 
society plagued by common crime, a will to modernize without democracy, an endemic 
impunity and absence of justice, and the overwhelming presence of the narco-trafficking 
culture. The result of all this is that politics are rejected as an undesirable activity.  Plan 
Colombia fails to answer a central question: is it exclusively geared to terminate the drug-
trafficking activity, or is it proposed to address other issues?   
 
                                                 
96 ABC, “Chile, el mejor mercado valorado de Latinoamérica”, 7 enero 2001. 
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The resolution of the Colombian situation offers three variables: an improbable 
victory of one of the parties, the very plausible continuation of the conflict, and a process 
of political negotiation, an option that seems more feasible in the medium term. However, 
the Colombian government should be warned that in negotiating with the guerrillas, the 
aim of accomplishing peace requires that the opponents come out with their heads up to 
guarantee their reinsertion into the society. Terms of surrender and sudden 
demobilization are to be avoided if the objective is solid negotiation between the 
government and all sectors of the society on one side, and the insurgent groups on the 
other. This negotiation should include all of the pending issues plaguing Colombian 
society: the agrarian problem, the management of energy resources, political 
representation, social policy, regional powers, the role of the police and military, and a 
policy to protect the safety of the population. 
 
This diplomatic view is realistic, too. A short-term solution is not predicted. The 
construction of a truly democratic government will not be possible if important sectors of 
the society are excluded. All sides have to cooperate to counteract inertia when a 
government is floundering, lacks credibility and territorial control. The challenge is to 
create a new state. 
 
In answer to President Pastrana’s petition for international cooperation, Spain’s 
diplomats have been doubly concerned. On the one hand they took note of the critical 
approach of their colleagues in the European Union, who have another sensibility for 
Latin American issues. On the other, they saw that Spain may appear isolated once the 
critical sectors manage to swing the general attitude. The Plan Colombia was perceived 
as imprecise, militaristic and dictated by the United States. Spain’s diplomats suggested 
that the Colombian government should be persuaded to delay the selling and 
implementation of the Plan, deleting all items that have to do with the fight against drugs 
or the eradication of illegal crops. As a substitution, Colombia was invited to present 
another plan composed almost exclusively of projects for social and economic 
development, agrarian reform, improvement of justice, and the fight against corruption.
97 
 
In any event, Spain’s specificity in answering Colombia’s plea is shown in terms 
of Madrid’s early response and in volume. The special relationship that is the trade mark 
of Spain’s links with Latin America has a special profile. The specific linkage between 
the Spanish government and Colombia is framed in the General Treaty of Cooperation 
and Friendship signed on October 29, 1992, and the Act of the Joint Commission signed 
on March 15, 1999, confirmed by the declaration of the Spanish government issued on 
July 7, 2000, pledging all available help in support of the peace process.
98 Spain 
                                                 
97 The above items, comments and recommendations are a summary of several conversations conducted 
during the months of July and September of 2000 and July of 2001 with Spanish diplomats with direct 
knowledge and duties in the area, and are supplemented with the consultation of pertinent documentation. 
All arguments included were proposed, circulated and discussed several months before the official 
dissemination of the Plan and the trip of President Clinton to Cartagena de Indias (Colombia) in August 
2000.   
98 It is interesting to note that personal support is not limited to the unquestionable backing of Pastrana’s 
actions. Leading candidate Alvaro Uribe has received the protection of the chief of security of Spain’s 
president (Semana, “Protección de Aznar,”  abril 29, 2002, p. 23). 
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committed then more than $100 million for the 2000-2003 period, about a third of the 
sum committed by all of the European states and from the EU budget. As previously 
described, roughly $76 million are in loans (FAD), $12 million for microcredit programs 
and about $12 million in direct donations. Six principal areas were identified: social 
needs, human development, poverty reduction, environment, good governance, and 
conflict prevention. Three lines of action are present in all sectors: fight against poverty, 
equality between men and women, and environmental protection. Coordination with 
NGOs and international organizations is a priority. In addition to this basic funding, other 
programs managed by the International Cooperation Agency were implemented for the 
approximate amounts of  $12 million in 2001 and a similar sum in 2002. Spain’s local 
and regional cooperation programs with Colombia received about $6 million in 
government grants for 2001. In total, Spain’s contribution has matched the pledge 
announced at the meeting of donors held in Madrid on July 7, 2000.
99                  
 
Nonetheless, the general picture of actual financial support is unclear. Observers 
may be well advised to scrutinize the details of the Spanish pledge in terms of funding 
projects to be backed and items to be financed. As in other cases of Spain’s development 
assistance programs (not an exception in the overall European picture) the pitching of 
Plan Colombia became the selling of the contribution of real and virtual programs and 
projects. In the absence of detailed documentation, as we have seen, the bulk of the total 
package (between US $100 and $124 million) may ultimately be a composite of current 
projects with the addition of commercial lines of credit. Let’s keep in mind that seventy 
percent of the funds pledged belong to credits controlled by the Ministry of the Economy, 
while only 24 percent are to come from the funding of projects directly administered by 
Spain’s aid agency. When pressed for details of the specific Spanish package to be 
presented in coordination with other European donors, data and documentation on 
specific projects have not been available.
100                
 
 
Other European Institutions and Partners 
                                     
As in any other political family, there are members more inclined to show radical 
attitudes than others. Facing Plan Colombia, some EU member states have distinguished 
themselves by maintaining a sharper antagonistic view. Belgium and Germany have been 
leaders in insisting that the EU should distance itself from Plan Colombia and that 
European assistance should be limited to a set of conditions.
101 Belgium, Italy, Sweden, 
Germany, Austria and Denmark have been at the forefront of insistence on program 
funding for the protection of human rights and the involvement of civil society. However, 
some members (Germany, Austria) have been concerned by the fact that strong 
declarations and politically-imposed limitations may hinder the effectiveness of existing 
projects in Colombia, making the contribution of some states very problematic because 
                                                                                                                                                 
        
99 Embassy of Spain in Bogotá, “Nota informativa sobre la cooperación española en Colombia,” OTC 
Colombia, abril 2002. 
100 Information derived from European Union sources (January 2001). 
101 COLAT, “Council of the European Union. Meeting”, September 26, 2000. 
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they are not ready to provide “fresh money.”
102 These shortcomings reveal the 
dependency of European assistance on national programs, or in the context of sub-
groupings.      
 
The Grupo de Países Amigos has been at the forefront of international 
involvement that contributes to facilitate agreements and contacts between the Colombian 
factions. The group was designed with a clear strategy to reflect that it has the European 
Union as a nuclear axis (Spain and France), but it also includes states that have either a 
reputation for being neutral (Switzerland) or with considerable experience in serving as a 
bridge (Norway). Cuba is the Latin American representative and this reflects its sincere 
commitment to resolve the crisis as it is also a strategy which demonstrates it has more to 
lose if problems become worse. The top Cuban leadership (including Fidel Castro 
himself) has been actively involved in obtaining the most important diplomatic successes 
in dealing with the ELN. In sum, most of the important agreements between the 
Colombian government and the FARC have been crafted with the support and diplomacy 
offered by the Group.  
 
Members of the Group are very critical of the attitude of the ELN, but they did 
make efforts to engage the guerrillas in the negotiations during the last two years, 
culminating in a series of agreements crafted in a meeting held in Havana on January 12, 
2002. Under the auspices of the Spanish presidency of the EU, the main parties (the 
Colombian government and the ELN) committed themselves to meet in Havana from 
January 29-31, accompanied by the members or representatives of the “Facilitating 
Commission” and the National Convention, the presidential candidates, the UN, and 
several sectors of Colombian society. This initial Havana conclave was held with notable 
media exposure and its opening was presided by Fidel Castro himself,
103 who in turn was 
ready to serve in a similar process of mediation with the FARC. All this happened while 
alleged links between Cuba and international terrorism (such as the IRA and ETA) were 
aired in the press and energetically denounced by different governments and right-wing 
interests in Colombia.
104 This dimension received close attention during the hearings held 
by the U.S. Congress in late April 2002.
105 
 
A number of thematic forums were subsequently scheduled. The first one on 
humanitarian law hosted by Switzerland (Feb-25-27), the second on participating 
democracy and the State in Spain (March 25-27), followed by agrarian reform in France 
(April 29-May1), energy resources in Norway (May 27-29), ending with a last one on the 
economy and social problems in Havana (June 24-26). France and Spain conditioned the 
issuing of visas to the end of kidnappings and other violations of human rights in the 
ELN-controlled zone, while this guerrilla group was given notice of the strict Common 
Positions delivered by the EU on international terrorism, as a result of the new 
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international climate. When the ELN representatives claimed that the policy of 
kidnapping was dictated by “financing necessities” the EU representatives stated that this 
notion was unacceptable.
106 Subsequently, the series of forums were cancelled.
107        
   
The development of Plan Colombia caught Paris in a triple capacity. First, France 
was holding the presidency of the European Union during the second semester of 2000. 
France is also a Member of the Group of Friends. In 2002, the French Ambassador 
Daniel Parfait
108 held the presidency of this international group supporting the peace 
efforts. In addition to this diplomatic dimension, France has been traditionally an 
influential leading force in Latin American affairs, especially where French cultural and 
economic interests (French investment is the leader in Colombia) are most prevalent.  
The French government could not afford to miss this opportunity to strengthen its 
somewhat weakened position in the world after the end of the Cold War. In spite of this 
evidence, French officials insist that France’s involvement in Colombia is a matter of 
principles. In the French view, Colombia is experiencing a loss of values similar to the 
way France did at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century. The key is the identification 
of the balance between “liberty and equality,” with the proper insertion of “fraternity”.
109 
While in some dimensions of domestic policy the influence of conservative President 
Jacques Chirac is present, in most avenues of foreign policy France still seems to reflect 
the lines of François Mitterrand. This becomes most obvious in France’s attitude toward 
sensitive Latin American angles of U.S. foreign policy. For example, the cases of Cuba 
(opposing the extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws, such as Helms-Burton and D’Amato’s 
ILSA) and Central America (leading Europe in the design of policies of cooperation 
assistance during the 1980s). The French government is also backed by its vocal pro-
leftist and liberal press, led by the influential Le Monde
110 and by the traditional leaning 
of its academicians towards the causes of the marginalized
111 and the need of identifying 
the real victim of the conflict, the Colombian society.
112   
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In this line of thought, speaking while holding the presidency of the European 
Union, Ambassador Renaud Vignal, director of the Americas department of the Quai 
D’Orsay, endorsed with clarity the overall assessment of the European Commission and 
measured the consensus of the most vocal member states. The program of European 
support of the Peace Process, as Europe’s response prefers to be known, confirms that the 
search for peace is the only hope that Colombia has. This is a process that needs time, 
patience and a dose of compromise for all parties involved in the conflict. According to 
his statement, there is no other alternative. Echoing other European voices, there is no 
military solution that would guarantee a lasting peace that can only come from a general 
agreement. He then pledged a complete package to be carried out with the cooperation of 
other organizations, based on the following points: support of the state of law, defense of 
human rights, fight against the causes of violence, environmental protection, and 
consolidation of regional cooperation. The example of European integration can be used 
in gathering the contribution of neighboring states. 
 
For the last two years, the United Kingdom has expressed its commitment to the 
peace process in Colombia in the form of unequivocal declarations to contribute to the 
efforts of international organizations and NGOs, to distance itself from the most 
controversial aspects of the original Plan Colombia, and with the delivery of funds. The 
UK has translated its commitment to the Colombian peace process with concrete 
contributions to the programs of the UN Human Rights Office in Bogotá. Since March 
2000, more than £348,000 have been disbursed, including £50,000 to the UN Trust Fund. 
Since a trend-setting speech given by President Pastrana in London on April 13, 2000,
113 
British public opinion and the actions of the Foreign Office have confirmed a traditional 
line of action, well outlined in public documents,
114 and shared with private 
organizations.
115 
  
On the linkages with the U.S.-led Plan Colombia, first the British government has 
declared that it is the Colombian government’s program to tackle Colombia’s 
interconnected problems. “Neither we nor the EU have made a contribution to the Plan.” 
The Guardian aptly illustrated a general opinion: “Nobody wants to be seen at the tag end 
of a US plan – particularly when some countries don’t agree with the military.”
116 In 
public declarations and private communications, this line of thought has been consistent: 
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  34   
“There is no UK Government financial involvement in Plan Colombia, either bilaterally 
or through the EU. No expenditure is planned by the UK Government to support the 
Plan.” 
117 However, British public opinion and leaders recognize the responsibility of the 
international society in creating part of the problems of Colombia.
118 General Michael 
Rose, who became very well known in the pacification process of Yugoslavia, recalled 
that “we conveniently forget that it is our social habit of taking drugs that has wrecked a 
country, destroyed large areas of the Amazon rainforest, killed 24,000 people in 1999 
alone, and blighted the lives of millions of Colombian people”. Consequently, he 
considers that  “the international community is proceeding with undue caution – mainly 
because of the past human rights record of the Colombian security forces. He also 
considers the EU financial support as “niggardly compared with the high level of drugs 
money flowing into Colombia from Europe.”
119 
 
  British high officials have expressed their opinion and attitudes in public and in 
different statements made in private on some specific issues regarding the Colombian 
crisis. In the first place, the British government has always been very  concerned about 
increasing levels of violence, particularly that directed towards trade unionists and human 
rights defenders, and therefore, it has raised its concerns with the Colombian authorities. 
Respect for human rights and international humanitarian law is seen as a pre-requisite for 
advancing the peace process and an indispensable basis for expanded international 
support. London considers that the best way to secure and improve human rights in 
Colombia is through progress in the peace talks between the Colombian Government and 
the main guerrilla groups. Among the initiatives suggested are actions to help combat the 
appalling practice of child soldiers. Central to the British strategy has been to support the 
efforts of Jan Egeland, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Colombia. 
In the EU context, the British representatives have urged the Commission to channel as 
much aid as possible through reputable international and local NGOs with a proven track 
record in delivering humanitarian assistance. In this direction, the UK places high 
importance on  the accountability and transparency of EU assistance. On the other hand, 
London does not believe that the Commission should impose a blanket ban on aid to the 
Colombian government.
120 
 
  More specifically, the British government is very concerned about the continuing 
high-levels of violence committed by the illegal paramilitary groups against members of 
NGOs and the allegations of harassment from the Colombian armed forces. However, the 
UK does not distinguish between their atrocities and those of the FARC and the ELN. It 
is perceived that they are all involved in illicit drug production, and are all responsible for 
mass kidnappings, extortion and murder. There is no evidence that the FARC enjoys 
popular support among large sections of the Colombian population. Moreover, British 
officials consider that the Colombian government, in agreeing to the existence of a zone 
for the FARC, has shown itself to be much more serious about its intentions to find 
                                                 
117 Private communication from high official of the Foreign Office, 2 October 2001. 
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peace.
121 The events of February 2002 have confirmed this view, generally shared by 
other European partners.  
 
As a member of the Group of Friends, and most especially as a guardian of the 
Geneva Convention, the Swiss government has been instrumental in providing an added 
credibility to European efforts to facilitate the peace process. In successive declarations, 
Switzerland has stressed the need for obtaining a lasting peace, using all kinds of efforts. 
Reaffirming the views of the other European partners, Switzerland places among its 
priority points compliance with international human rights agreements, a general 
consensus generated by all sectors of the Colombian people, and a careful analysis of 
environmental damage. Consequently, Swiss representatives express difficulty in 
accepting the military component of the Plan and the indiscriminate crop eradication 
program. With a pledge of $12 million (later expanded to $20 million) to be dispersed 
over three years, the Swiss have claimed that they will contribute to the following areas: 
assisting the displaced people, the protection of human rights, the negotiation with the 
ELN, the establishment of the office of the Defender of the People, and diverse support 
for NGOs.
122 
 
Few observers can deny the important influence of Germany not only in EU 
affairs but in the overall global scene. In a very systematic way, the Federal Republic of 
Germany has regained its central place in world affairs since its near self-destruction as a 
result of World War II. German leadership also understood the message of Robert 
Schuman and, as a west Federal Republic and as a reunified country, has been at the 
forefront of the EU presence in the world. It is not surprising that the Colombian crisis, in 
view of the overpowering presence of German investment in Latin America and the 
generosity of its development assistance programs (30% of the total EU activities), has 
caught the attention of the German government. To sum up Germany’s attitude toward 
Plan Colombia it can be stated that it supports the efforts of the government and the 
Colombian people to create peace in the country within the framework of bilateral 
agreements. Germany does not want its activities to be identified with Plan Colombia. It 
supports the peace process along with other Europeans in their own European program.
123 
These principles reflect the evolution of an attitude expressed in several individual 
declarations and adhesions to the EU positions. In the recording of EU official meetings, 
Germany “insisted on making very clear in the text that the EU distance itself from Plan 
Colombia.”
124 Negotiations are the only way to obtain peace. Germany backed this view 
with a 50% increase (10 million DM) in its financial contribution to Colombia, which 
today has totaled 1.57 billion DM (almost $ 800 million).
125     
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One of the most vocal opponents of the U.S.-inspired version of the Plan, 
Belgium, has been leading the European voices that believe the causes for the Colombian 
crisis lay beyond the guerrilla activities and drug trafficking. Pointing out the “inequality, 
low living standards and inadequacy of the government to meet the demands”, the 
Belgium government is “diametrically opposed” to the Plan as presented by the 
Colombian government, wishing a more “integral solution” and pledging the support of 
social programs through funds distributed by Belgium NGOs. Figures have amounted to 
BF 100 million in recent years, the pledge of a loan of BF 23 million for conflict 
prevention programs, extra funding of BF 50 million for 2001, and there are similar 
expectations for 2002. Total contribution amounts to about US$ 8 million.
126   
 
Sweden has distinguished itself in two areas: its independent political view and 
the volume ($20 million) of pledged contributions, which is the second highest among the 
EU countries. This contribution consists of all new direct assistance and loans, without 
including credits. In political terms, Sweden is a force to influence EU decisions and 
protect member state autonomy in foreign policy, setting the tone for the Commission’s 
actions. A balance between the work of the Group of Ten and a coordinated policy of the 
EU is the ideal Swedish attitude. A political solution based on a careful analysis of all 
social, economic and military dimensions is the best policy to follow, keeping the door 
open for a renewed negotiation with the FARC. This is reflected in Sweden’s resistance 
to the inclusion of the guerrillas in the EU list of terrorist organizations, an act that would 
have made future negotiations much more difficult.
127 
 
Although not a member of the European Union, Norway is the second largest 
European provider of direct assistance to Colombia. Oslo has pledged to transfer $20 
million to NGOs for human rights and humanitarian projects. This contribution was 
committed as early as July 2000 in Madrid and was earmarked for the on for the period 
2000–2002.  Norway has been at the forefront of insistence on program funding for the 
protection of human rights and the involvement of civil society. Previously, Norway’s 
funding made possible the opening of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights in Bogotá in 1997. Most especially in the ELN negotiations, Norway is 
participating to support the efforts of bringing about fundamental political, economic and 
social reforms as a prerequisite for lasting peace in the country and to reduce violence 
and the suffering of the civilian population. Norway also contributes with diplomatic and 
political efforts as a member of the Group of Friends, and with humanitarian assistance to 
the victims of the conflict. Norwegian funding also supports initiatives to mobilize a 
stronger participation of the civil society in the conflict resolution processes and to 
promote and protect human rights. The funds are to be channeled exclusively to the 
United Nations and other international organizations, Norwegian and local NGOs, with 
no funds committed to Colombian government programs, due to the fact that Norway has 
no bilateral cooperation agreement with this government.
128  
 
                                                 
126 See Hedí Boutmans, "La cooperación al desarrollo contribuye a una paz duradera en Colombia", 
noviembre 2000. 
127 From EU and Sweden sources. 
128 Data from EU and Norwegian sources.  
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Among individual European states, Denmark has pledged $0.6 million, Austria 
promised $0.6 million for social and institutional development, Finland announced $2.2 
million for human rights programs under the UN programs, Italy committed $10 million 
for a “Culture of Peace” and local institutions projects, and Portugal has reserved 
$250,000 for social development and institutional strengthening. 
     
  
NGOs and Civil Society: Initiative and Watchdog 
 
Heavily dependent on government funding, private organizations and grass-roots 
movements have a long history of contributing to the development of Latin American 
countries, fighting against violations of human rights and oppression, and participating in 
the peace processes. While material actions are limited by the terrain and political 
circumstances, the influence of these organizations and private citizens has grown since 
the explicit announcement of Plan Colombia.
129 Among the European organizations, Pax 
Christi has taken the lead with fact-finding missions and reports. Cuba and Colombia 
have been the subjects of recent missions. The Colombia project took place in the first 
part of 2001, and its conclusions are still mostly valid, reflecting a view that can be 
described as shared by many independent European perceptions, critical of the social and 
political conditions in Colombia, the inadequacy of U.S. participation, and the slowness 
and vague commitment of Europe and the international community at large.
130 
 
The visit of Pax Christi’s commission “was intended to provide an additional 
impetus to European solidarity with the victims of the Colombian conflict”. Its “main 
                                                 
129For example:  Drugs and Conflict: http://www.tni.org/reports/drugs/debate1.pdf; Amnesty International, 
“Amnesty International’s Position On Plan Colombia”, Paper No. 1, June 2000: 
http://www.amnesty-usa.org/news/2000/colombia07072000.html; Ricardo Vargas Meza, “Europe and Plan 
Colombia, Drugs & Conflict Debate Paper,” TNI, no. 1, April 2001: 
http://www.tni.org/drugs/research/plcoleu.htm. From Human Rights Watch, Brussels: Lotte Leicht and José 
Miguel Vivanco, HRW Appeal to EU to Suspend Aid to Colombia, Human Rights Watch, September 1, 
2000: http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/09/eu-ltr0911.htm   
For a supplementary, balanced U.S. view: United States Institute of Peace Library, Plan Colombia: Plan for 
Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State, May 15, 2000: 
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/colombia/adddoc/plan_colombia_101999.html
Center for International Policy
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/102701.htm
. For an early assesment 
of Plan Colombia: Ingrid Vaicius, Adam Isacson, and Abbey Steele, “Is Plan Colombia 
dead?”,  , October 27, 2000: 
 
130 International Delegation of Pax Christi Netherlands in Colombia, “Peace in Colombia; a matter of civil 
initiatives”, Pax Christi, February 22-March 10, 2001: http://www.paxchristi.nl/colpax2001ukr.html. As a 
sample of other minority organizations based in the Netherlands that oppose the Plan Colombia: Stop Plan 
Colombia,  http://www.stopplancolombia.nl/. A sample of Radio Netherlands commentary: Saskia van 
Rheenen, “Plan Colombia Divides Europe and US”, Radio Netherlands, March 1, 2001: 
http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots/html/colombia010302.html 
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objective was to promote international aid to the local peace initiatives by citizens.” The 
report reflects that the “people of Colombia are rightly proud of all that is still good in 
their country, but there is an urgent need for international recognition and aid.” However, 
“the political climate in Colombia has not improved since the start of the peace 
negotiations between the government and the armed resistance. There is skepticism 
surrounding the effectiveness of president Pastrana's peace strategy, his good intentions 
notwithstanding. The guerrillas demanded and have been granted far-reaching 
concessions, but have responded with mass kidnapping and structural extortion. The calls 
from many sections of the population for more effective, bolder measures are becoming 
louder.” Nevertheless, the report points out that the “people are aware that peace will 
only be achieved through negotiation, and that it will be years before the parties are able 
to sign a final peace accord.” 
 
On President Pastrana’s call for help from the international community, Pax 
Christi recalls that the United States only became involved “on a military level within the 
framework of the 'War on Drugs'”. In contrast, “the EU has only distanced itself from the 
American approach, but has offered no alternative.” The report emphasizes that “very 
little has come of the planned Colombian contribution to Plan Colombia of US$ 5 
billion”. “Partly as a result of intensive lobbying, Europe spoke out against the entire Plan 
Colombia, referring to the military element being performed by the Americans. They did 
indicate a willingness to fund social projects, and focused on areas similar to the social 
component of Plan Colombia - crop substitution, peace developments, a reinforcement of 
the constitutional state and economic development.  Most of the international 
contribution comes in bilateral aid”.  
 
Moreover, “there is no joint European policy for how the contributions will be 
spent, and the details of these projects remain largely unclear. The European Commission 
itself is bearing only US$ 90 million of the social development projects (3.6% of the 
international community's total). The details are also almost entirely unknown”. 
Furthermore, the report demands, “Colombia would benefit from rapid payment of the 
project monies. The government institution for crop substitution, PLANTE, for example, 
is carrying out the current projects with American aid funds (US$ 102.5 million through 
USAID). These budgets, however, are insufficient in total to finance the crop 
substitution. The PLANTE institute has as yet heard nothing concrete from the EU.” 
 
As a consequence, “support from the EU to Colombia has so far been limited, 
fragmented, unclear and slow.” This is “partly explained by mistrust of the Colombian 
government and the American military support to Plan Colombia. But another significant 
fact is that interest in Latin America is fading in Europe. For various reasons, EU foreign 
policy and development cooperation officials are focusing their attention on other parts of 
the world.” Pax Christi Netherlands, however, “is of the opinion that Dutch and European 
attention for Colombia is essential.” 
  Other aspects of the report include the following:  
 Europe is involved in various ways in the conflict, and cannot view the specific drug issue in 
isolation from European society. After all, Europe is an important supplier of the chemicals for 
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drugs production, forms an important market for Colombian drugs, and part of the drugs income is 
laundered through European banks. 
 Many Colombians are now pinning their hopes on the EU, because they associate the United 
States mainly with military involvement. Until now, however, this hope has been unjustified, and 
the United States - surprisingly enough - has been acting more effectively than a divided and slow 
Europe in the areas of crop substitution and even human rights (pressure on the army). 
 The prospects of a structural, national peace will remain slight as long as the armed parties 
continue to have considerable economic interests in sustaining the war. The international 
community therefore has an obligation to tackle these interests, both in Colombia and elsewhere. 
 On the other hand, in the absence of a national peace agreement, the international community must 
provide support to citizens who gain freedom at a local level every day against the interests of the 
armed parties. It would appear that socio-economically stronger municipalities are far more 
resilient against the advancing armed parties who threaten them with forced drugs growing, 
recruitment and violence with impunity. In this sense, economic development programs with a 
social dimension make a contribution to practical peace efforts. Basic organizations such as church 
and social bodies, NGOs and cooperatives are collaborating to an increasing extent in the 
development of the region. This relates to projects in the areas of crop substitution, agricultural 
projects for small farmers and other employment projects. 
 The European agricultural policy, with its import restrictions that include Latin American 
countries, hinders the development of alternative agricultural crops in Colombia. Many farmers 
are also interested in the development of organic farming. But access to the European market is 
also essential for organic crops. In addition, technical training and (organic) certification will be 
necessary. 
The report offers some concrete recommendations for the role of the European Union: 
 In view of the seriousness of the conflict, the effect it has on the region, and the European 
involvement in the Colombian drug issue the European Union is morally obliged to make a 
contribution to possible solutions. 
 Europe should set its own course with respect to Colombia, separate from the bilateral activities of 
the United States and Colombia. This relationship could be given form both inside and outside 
Plan Colombia. 
 The ambassadors must play a role in the design and implementation of this joint European policy. 
Their recommendations must be based on a permanent dialogue with local social organizations, 
the church, the Colombian government, the armed parties, the military and the economic elite. 
 The European Union (bilateral and the EC) should conduct a permanent joint policy with respect 
to Colombia directed to a structural approach to the causes of the conflict: socioeconomic 
development, manual eradication and crop substitution, agricultural reform, combating corruption, 
encouraging good administration, environmental policy, supporting native societies and 
reinforcing the legal system. Also the public educational system and the health care system should 
be given full attention, because the Colombian government gives higher priority to military 
projects.  
 The EU has shown signs of an ambivalent position with respect to Colombia. On the one hand, the 
EU has distanced itself from the military component of Plan Colombia, but on the other hand, the 
financial commitments made by the EU are too limited to result in serious crop substitution and 
socioeconomic development. This support is indispensable for the peace process, especially on a 
local level. 
 The Plan Alterno (crop substitution and social development) of the governor of Cauca deserves 
special recommendation. The future European Observation Committee must play a supplementary 
role in the identification of useful projects and local peace initiatives. 
 The concrete substance of the current European commitments (bilateral and from the European 
Commission) is fragmented, unclear and slow. The associated EC decision-making must proceed 
transparently, and a more rapid effectuation of the aid funds is necessary. 
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 The Colombian government has indicated that the support from that EU can be channeled through 
'the basis' (church, local NGOs, etc) as well as through the national government. The local church 
bodies could be a useful instrument for channeling aid funds, despite their limited capacity. The 
fact is that the Roman Catholic Church in Colombia enjoys sufficient moral authority among the 
various Colombian parties, has excellent contacts with the basis and takes responsibility for the 
continuity of the activities. 
 The joint European policy must also contain a guideline for the international committees who are 
to negotiate with the armed parties (the FARC, the ELN and probably in the future with the 
paramilitaries). Important components of these guidelines must be: respect for international 
humanitarian law by the armed parties (humanitarian agreement) and bringing an end to the 
funding of the conflict by the drugs trade.  
 The EU must enter into a dialogue with the military and economic elite in addition to the 
negotiations with the armed parties. Both groups have an obligation to make realistic proposals 
for peace and socioeconomic development. The economic elite could make a substantial financial 
contribution to their execution. 
 
 
 
Conclusions: The Needs, Limitations, and Prospects of European Support 
 
In spite of the worsening situation as a result of the decision of February 20 to terminate 
the peace process with the FARC, once the security situation permits, the European 
commitment will not falter at least in the political and humanitarian sectors. The pressure 
to participate will continue, in spite of formidable obstacles, from a series of related 
factors.  
 
Among the positive factors, the following should be outlined: 
 
1.  First and above all, European participation has always been welcome in Latin 
America in general and especially in unique crises such as the one in Colombia. 
European contributions are seldom perceived as cases of “injerencia”. In fact, if 
the European involvement in Central America serves as a comparative base, the 
participation of the European Union, its Member States, or European NGOs is not 
a procedural mandate that needs to be monitored for reasons of justifying budgets 
and expenses. The blue emblem with the twelve stars very often functions as a 
shield of excellence and a guarantee, in clear contrast with the ambivalence 
towards the identification of programs funded by U.S. agencies. This may be an 
unfair treatment of the overall contribution record of U.S. actors but it simply 
reflects the damage inflicted by past mistakes. The use of the mediating, 
facilitating, and monitoring services of the European states and agencies is 
considerable political capital that can successfully be used in the future.               
2.  U.S. government sources, think tanks, and academics, agree with the Colombian 
government that Europe is an indispensable actor. In view of the complexity of 
the Colombian crisis, it needs to be addressed by a multiplicity of contributors.
131 
                                                 
131 Among the impressive number of reports that stress the need of a coordinated international action with 
the inclusion of European actors, see the impeccable study drafted by the International Crisis Group, La 
esquiva búsqueda de la paz en Colombia (Bogotá, 26 marzo 2002). 
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No commentator questions the pivotal role to be played by the European actors 
regarding international assistance to Colombia, either under the umbrella of the 
European Union, delegating their humanitarian functions to the NGO networks, or 
using the corresponding autonomy of the foreign policies of the Member States. 
3.  Before September 11, the role to be played by European actors would probably be 
enhanced and receive more impetus if a more cautious U.S. policy in Colombia 
was implemented as a result of a reformed view of the new Bush 
administration.
132 Then and now, a more diplomatic implementation of the Plan 
Colombia (or its variances after February 20, 2002) may give more breathing 
room to the European impetus, free from an entanglement in a complex scenario 
worsened by the priority status given to military arguments.
133 The flair of 
“negotiation” (a textbook case of potential cooperation) between the United States 
and its European partners facilitated by the “retreat” of the most irritating aspects 
of the original Plan Colombia provided both parties with a sense of 
accomplishment. For the United States government, this might have been 
obtained at the cost of blaming the projects of the previous administration. For the 
Europeans, the reduction of the military aspects of the Plan was the base for 
selling a more generous package of aid. A common strategy developed by the 
U.S. government and the European Union on pressuring the Colombian 
government for more effective control of the paramilitary forces was still in 
order.
134 However, instead of simply opposing Plan Colombia, European 
observers have been keenly pointing out that the results of fumigation have been 
even questioned by internal evaluation of intelligence agencies of the United 
States. Some evaluations advice to replicate (or cooperate with) the European 
programs, focusing on the Magdalena Medio projects.    
4.  Once the peace process is resumed, a greater European leading role, backed by 
development assistance funds and investment nurtured by a better economic 
climate, would provide them with a much needed pressure base to be used vis-à-
vis the guerrilla factions to come to the table for real negotiations beyond cease 
fires and neutral zones. The events of January 2002 confirmed this thesis, 
dramatized by the breakdown of February 20.  
5.  It may well be that the precedent of the Central American experience still allows 
us to have hope. Granted the end of the Cold War might have contributed to the 
resolution of the Peace Process to a greater extent than the pressure exerted by the 
European contribution through the tenacious road traveled during the San José 
Process. It is also true that the negotiations and an end to the bloody conflicts did 
not eradicate the socioeconomic causes of the civil wars, although the massacres 
ended. The complexity of the Colombian crisis and its subsequent spillover effect 
in the Andean region may present an insurmountable obstacle, too large to be 
solved by the assistance given by European-led aid. At least putting an end to the 
mutual massacres may be a reasonable goal to be achieved. After February 20, the 
urgent objective is diplomatic mediation. 
                                                 
132 Sergio Gómez Maseri, “Informe de Clinton da garrote y zanahoria,” El Tiempo, 27 enero 2001. 
133 The New York Times, “Combustible Colombia”, Editorial, January 28, 2001; EFE, “Bush backs 
training Colombians,” The Miami Herald, Jan. 27, 2001, 3A. 
134 Scott Wilson, “Chronicle”, “Ejército de paramilitares, amenaza para el país”, 28 enero 2001. 
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Among the major difficulties, the following still must be addressed: 
 
1.  For most of 2001 and 2002, European involvement has been presided over by a 
double discourse, dictated by a combination of declarations and a wait-and-see 
attitude. The matter presented a more positive outlook after the January 31, 2001, 
deadline forced the renewal of talks between President Pastrana and FARC leader 
Marulanda. More positive developments occurred before and after Colombian 
officials met Europeans in Brussels to iron out the details of the European 
contribution, following the recommendations issued by the team of European 
experts who toured Colombia in a mission of identifying and evaluating projects 
to be funded.
135 Nonetheless, the Colombian scenario and its agenda until the 
February 20, 2002, fiasco were still dominated by the commentary offered by a 
high representative of a European government: “We will make a virtual 
contribution to a virtual peace plan.”
136 This was confirmed by the declarations 
that led to the Resolution of the European Parliament. Nonetheless, at the same 
time, this message has served, then and now, as pressure on all parties to sit down 
and negotiate. 
2.  The second problem for the implementation of European aid has always been, 
before and after February 20, the security limitations presented by the activities of 
the guerrilla organizations (the ELN in a wide zone targeted for EU pilot 
programs; the FARC in the rest of the country), and by the threat presented by the 
right-wing paramilitary groups. Without a relatively peaceful climate and 
protection guarantees, independent NGOs can do very little to improve local 
conditions. The Colombian government has been unable to prove that it can 
maintain even a minimum level of security for the implementation of important 
projects as estimates regarding the size of national territory under government 
control range between 30 and 40 percent, and state security is not even visibly 
present in provincial capitals. 
3.  In addition to the above shortcomings, observers in Brussels and the diplomatic 
representations in Bogotá consider that the local Colombian organizations 
(government and private) do not have the capacity (or the honesty) to manage the 
impressive amounts announced. Setting this precedent for humanitarian and 
development aid is accompanied by a certain degree of skepticism regarding the 
ability of the agencies to deliver the assistance because of the traditional setbacks 
including: delays in receiving funds and resources, competition among the 
different groups, lack of coordination and the so-called “absorption capability.” In 
order to overcome this handicap, Colombian leadership will have to come up with 
concrete plans to be offered to the international actors in sensitive areas such as 
cession of sovereignty, cooperation with international justice, and transparency.
137  
                                                 
135 El Tiempo, “Unión Europea: sin diálogo, ayuda no tiene sentido”, El Tiempo, 19 enero 2001: 
http://www.analitica.com/va/sintesis/internacionales/5498260.asp 
136 From European Union sources. 
137 For  a sample of some novel proposals, see the conclusions of the workshop held in Cartagena de Indias, 
April 25-26, 2002, by the Fundación Ideas para la Paz. 
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4. In short, “good intentions,” the title of a classic analysis of international 
assistance, is the fitting label to be applied to the balance of global aid to 
Colombia.
138 However, it is also true that European contributors hold high 
expectations, and this should not be considered unusual, but standard in 
international relations.   
 
In sum, some conclusions are in order: 
 
1. In spite of these difficulties, the most optimistic observers believe that the 
prevalent uncertainty, international alarm, and the feeling of powerlessness in 
obtaining substantial military results will finally force the parties to come to terms 
and negotiate a lasting peace, which apparently was the background of the 
impasse and subsequent agreement of January 20, 2002. Since mid 2001, all 
efforts endorsed by the international community have come from that direction. 
Arrangements have included the exchange of prisoners, sick and injured 
combatants, and the pressure of the United States and the international community 
on the Colombian government to negotiate with the ELN.
139 Meanwhile, the 
government has reciprocated with a frequent message of “normalcy” to continue 
life as usual, a pattern that has been labeled as denial and an obstacle to finding a 
cure for the national ills.
140 This confluence of factors coexisted with the 
continued climate of violence, a social atmosphere laced by kidnappings, the 
confusing internal conflict of the paramilitary leadership,
141 and the sensation of 
fighting against time, at the end of Pastrana’s term, waiting for the next president 
to inherit the problems. The new president of Colombia should not make the 
mistake of confusing the fading of Europe’s fascination with the guerrillas with an 
endorsement of paramilitary actions. The best policy for obtaining the backing of 
Europe is to accept the reconstructive aspects of Europe’s “Plan Colombia,” in 
view of the predictable failure of the military solution.
142 In the context of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
138 Among other papers and opinions issued by Fernando Cepeda on this aspect, see: “Más allá de las 
buenas intenciones”, El Espectador, agosto 2001. See book by Sherman Forman and Steward Patrick, Good 
Intentions: Pledges for Aid for Postconflict Recovery, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000.     
139 AFP, “Insta EE.UU. a iniciar en breve diálogo de paz”, Diario las Américas, 10 junio 2001, 3A. 
140 Nothing dramatized this approach better than the decision to hold the soccer Copa América in Colombia 
in the summer of 2001. See Andrés Pastrana Arango, “Palabras del Presidente de la República”, 1 mayo 
2001:  http://www.presidencia.gov.co/webpresi/discurso/2001/infedisc.htm; Ana María  Salazar,   
“Colombia: la Copa de la Paz,” La Opinión de Los Angeles, 8 junio 2001;  Nora Alicia Estrada,  “La Copa 
América: una bomba de tiempo,” La Opinión de Los Angeles, 4 junio 2001.  
141 Sibylla Brozinsky, “Colombia’s civil war may get more violent,” The Miami Herald, June 7, 2001, 8a.; 
AFP,  “Anuncian las normas para la zona desmilitarizada del ELN,” El Nuevo Herald, 27 enero 2001.   
142 For a representative sample of this view, see Miguel Angel Bastenier, “Europa y las elecciones 
colombianas,” El Tiempo, 28 abril 2002. 
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May 26 election, most influential European observers and U.S. counterparts 
coincided in this thesis.
143   
2.  Throughout the crisis, the European Commission has been optimistic because the 
conditionality of aid based on the respect for human rights permitted this 
institution to focus in that area, where most of the projects funded by the EU are 
concentrated.
144 This agenda is fully backed by the Member States, who 
ultimately dictate the policy, either as individual governments or in coordination 
through the decision-making mechanism of the EU. After all, “la esperanza es lo 
último que se pierde,” a feeling shared by numerous Colombian organizations in 
search of an exit to the crisis.
145  With this objective, Europe has continued on 
betting for Colombia’s future. The temporary accords of January 20, 2002, 
harvested the results. It is expected that, in the event of a lessening of the 
confrontation after the breaking of the truce on February 20, the role of Europe 
will come back to center stage.  For the time being, the recognition will be the 
most coveted award.
146 While recognizing the imperfections and limitations, this 
paper tries to pay a minimum of justice to this European effort, whatever is the 
final result of the Colombian crisis. Most foreign observers feel that the 
impossibility of a total military success of either the Colombian Armed Forces or 
the guerrillas will finally give the spotlight back to the international community 
for a lead role in the negotiations towards a political settlement. This need was 
further dramatized by the plea made by President-elect Alvaro Uribe when he 
called for the mediation of the United Nations in solving the conflict.
147  
Paraphrasing Madeleine Albright’s labeling of the United States as the 
“indispensable” nation of the post-Cold War era, the European contribution will 
be duly recognized as the “irreplaceable participant” in the recovery of Colombia.  
 
 
  
                                                
 
 
 
 
143 Alain Abelard, “Les limites de l’option militaire face à la guerrilla,” Le Monde, May 25, 2002; Richard 
Feinberg, “La encrucijada colombiana,” El Tiempo, 26 mayo 2002; James Wilson, “The quiet Colombian,” 
Financial Times, May 26, 2002; M.A, Bastenier, “Ni paz ni guerra,” El País, 26 mayo 2002   
144 AFP, “UE rechaza de plano la parte militar del Plan Colombia,” Diario las Américas, 2 febrero 2001. 
145 See, for example, the periodic reports of the Fundación Social to the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights, Algo todavía ocurrirá (Bogotá: 2001). 
146 “El papel de la comunidad internacional”, El Tiempo, Bogotá, 21 enero 2002: 
http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/21-01-2002/prip160013.html 
147 Frances Robles, “Uribe backs peace talks –if rebels halt violence,” The Miami Herald, May 28, 2002, 
1A;  AFP, “Negociación es la única salida,” Diario las Américas, 30 mayo 2002, 10A; The Miami Herald, 
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